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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)( I), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, the following sets 
forth a complete list of all parties to the trial court proceeding: 
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Andrew L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff) 
Mark L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff, Respondent and Intervenor Defendant) 
Michelle Thomas (Plaintiff) 
Ken L. Ellsworth (Plaintiff) 
Tami Jasper (Plaintiff and Respondent) 
Tim Ellsworth (Plaintiff) 
The Ellsworth Family Trust dated May 1, 1991 (Plaintiff, Petitioner and Defendant) 
Appel lees 
Terry Huffstatler (Defendant, Petitioner, Intervenor Plaintiff) 
Jim Huffstatler (Defendant) 
Karl V. Baker (Defendant) 
Keith A. Baker (Defendant) 
The Ellsworth Family Trust dated May 1, 1991 (Plaintiff, Petitioner and Defendant) 
The Estate of Barbara Mae Ellsworth (Defendant) 
Barbara May Ellsworth (now deceased) (Defendant and Petitioner) 
Barbara May Ellsworth Trust date March 19, 2013 (Intervenor Plaintiff) 
In accordance with Rule 24( d) the Appellants will be sometimes be referred to 
herein as "Mark Ellsworth Parties," the Appellees will sometimes be referred to as "Terry 
Huffstatler Parties," The Ellsworth Family Trust, dated May 1, 199-1 will be referred to as 
the "1991 Trust," The Barbara May Ellsworth Trust, dated March 19, 2013 will be referred 
to as the "2013 Trust," Barbara May Ellsworth will be referred to as "Barbara," and Elmer 
"Bud" Ellsworth will be referred to as "Elmer." 
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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103Q). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT 
GRANTED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES BASED 
ON THE DETERMINATION THAT BARBARA ELLSWORTH BECAME THE 
OWNER OF THE PRECIOUS METALS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §75-3-
102? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Utah appellate courts review the district 
com1's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, affording the trial court no 
deference. Swan Creek Vil!. Homeowners Ass 'n. v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, lfl6, 134 P.3d 
1122. The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See e.g., Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ,r 10, 127 P.3d 
256 (interpretation of statute); Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, 
LLC, 2010 UT App 112, ,r 9,233 P.3d 529 (interpretation of statute); State v. Barney, 2008 
UT App 250, ,r 5, 189 P.3d 1277 (interpretation of statute); State v. Rowley, 2008 UT App 
233, ,r ~' 189 P.3d 109 (interpretation of statute). Appellants must show legal error by the 
trial court in its use of fixed principles and rules of law and by demonstrating that trial court 
incorrectly selected, interpreted and/or applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 934, 936 
(Utah 1994). 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Complaint (Verified) (R. 31 ); Amended Complaint (R. 114 ); Motion for 
Summary Judgment: Ownership of Precious Metals (R. 592); Amended Complaint 
(Second) (R. 913 ); Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Re Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1033); Motion for Summary Judgment: Supplemental Brief (R. 1047); 
Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1087); Stipulation to Bifurcate 
Precious Metals Issues (R. 1322); and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 
1685) 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT 
DETERMINED APPELLEES REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION THAT BARBARA'S 
CREATION OF THE 2013 TRUST WAS UNFAIR? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Appellants must show legal error by 
the trial court in its use of fixed principles and rules of law and by demonstrating 
that trial court incorrectly selected, interpreted and/or applied the law. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 936 (Utah 1994). An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous only if they are in 
conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if an appellate court has a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. The appellate court reviews the legal 
sufficiency of factual findings-that is, whether the trial court's factual findings are 
sufficient to support its legal conclusions-under a correction-of-error standard, according 
no particular deference to the trial court. Brown v. Babbitt 2015 UT App 161; 353 P.3d 
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1262 (Utah 2015). Appellants must show the trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous by marshalling all evidence supporting the finding, then showing the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings. Gilmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App 2, 
'1119, 224 P.3d 741. 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Complaint (Verified) (R. 31 ); Amended Complaint (R. 114 ); Amended 
Complaint (Second)· (R. 913 ); Trial Brief of Plaintiffs, Respondents and Intervenor 
Defendant (R. 1360); Defendants/Petitioners/Intervenor Plaintiffs Pretrial Brief (R. 1488); 
and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 1685) 
RULES, STATUTES ~ND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE APPEAL 
The following cited rules, statutes and regulations are determinative of the appeal 
or of central importance to the appeal and are set forth in the Addendum to this brief: 
Rule 56(c) Utah R. Civ. P. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-2-102 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below 
This case centers around the implementation of estate planning which was 
completed by Elmer and Barbara in 1991 as well as subsequent estate planning which was 
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completed by Barbara after Elmer's death. In the trial court proceeding, the parties disputed 
whether certain Precious Metals were properly transferred to Barbara via Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-102. Additionally, the parties contested the validity of certain transfers Barbara 
made from the 199 l Trust to the 2013 Trust (which Barbara created many years after 
Elmer's death). Appellants alleged Barbara lacked the requisite capacity to create the new 
trust and that she was unduly influenced when making the transfers to the 2013 Trust. 
During the course of proceedings below, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment: Ownership of Precious Metals ("Motion for Summary Judgment"). The trial 
court granted Motion for Summary Judgment ultimately determining that the Precious 
Metals belonged to Barbara. Appellants filed a petition for permission to file interlocutory 
appeal which was denied by this Court. The case proceeded to trial on the issues relating 
to the creation of the 2013 Trust and transfers thereto. The trial court determined the 2013 
was properly created and funded. Appellants thereafter filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
1. Elmer was a co-creator of the 1991 Trust and was Barbara's spouse. Elmer 
VJ1) died on February 7, 2003. (R. 1681, 1682)1 
2. Barbara was a co-creator of the 1991 Trust and the creator of the 2013 Trust 
and related estate planning documents. Barbara was Elmer's spouse. She passed away on 
December 18, 2013. (R. 1681, 1682) 
1 Many of the facts set forth herein are supported by the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, & Order (R. 1644-1685). This document is contained in the 
Addendum. 
4 
3. Appellants Andrew L. Ellsworth, Mark L. Ellsworth, Michelle Thomas, Ken 
L. Ellsworth, Tami Jasper and Tim Ellsworth are Elmer's biological children, Barbara's 
step-children, and are beneficiaries of the 1991 Trust. Mark Ellsworth was also a co-
successor trustee of the 1991 Trust. (R. 1681) 
4. Appellees Terry Huffstatler ("Terry"), Karl V. Baker and Keith A. Baker are 
Barbar~' s biological children, Elmer's step-children, and beneficiaries of the 1991 Trust 
and 2013 Trust. Additionally, Terry was a named co-successor trustee of the 1991 Trust, 
and is the court appointed personal representative of the Estate of Barbara Ellsworth. She 
is also the acting trustee of the 2013 Trust. Defendant Jim Huffstatler is Terry's husband. 
(R. 1681) 
5. At the same time Elmer prepared the 1991 Trust, on May I, 1991, Elmer 
executed a Last Will and Testament ("Will"). (Trial Exhibit 1 at pages 9-16)2 
6. Elmer owned certain gold, silver and platinum coins and bars ( collectively 
referred to herein as "Precious Metals") prior to his marriage to Barbara. (R. 1086) 
7;. The Fourth and Fifth paragraphs of Elmer's Will state in relevant part as 
follows: 
FOURTH: Personal Property 
If my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property 
( as hereinafter defined). If my spouse does not survive me, I give those items 
of Personal Property (but not money, notes, documents of title, stock 
certificates or business property) to the individuals named in my 
Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property. This memorandum shall 
be signed by me, shall describe each item and shall indicate the recipient 
thereof. If the named recipient of a particular item does not survive me, then 
2 Trial Exhibit I includes Elmer's Will. The Will is included in the Addendum. 
5 
that item shall pass as provided in Paragraph F[FTH; and if, after reasonable 
search among my personal effects, such a list cannot be found, my Personal 
Representative shall disregard the preceding language of this Paragraph. 
FIFTH: Disposition of Residuary Estate 
"My residuary estate" means all my interest in real or personal 
property, whether community or separate and wherever situated, which I may 
own at my death ( excluding property over which I may have a power of 
appointment) and which I have not disposed of by the preceding provisions 
of this Will. 
I give my residuary estate to the Trustee then acting under that certain 
Trust Agreement named the ELLSWORTH F AfyiIL Y TRUST created on the 
pt day of May, 1991, to be aggregated with (and held, administered, and 
distributed as an integral part of) said Trust Estate in the manner and subject 
to the terms and provisions provided for in the Trust Agreement .... 
(Trial Exhibit 1 at pages 11-12) 
8. The term "Personal Property" is not defined within the Will. (R. 1084) 
9. Elmer did not prepare a Memorandum of Disposition of Personal Property. 
(R. 1084) 
10. Elmer died on February 7, 2003, at which time Barbara became the sole 
trustee and primary beneficiary of the 1991 Trust. (R. 1681) 
11. Elmer's Will was never probated. (R. 1067) 
12. During the several years preceding Barbara's death in December 2013, she 
lived in various stages of ailing physical and mental health. (R. 1681) 
13. Barbara suffered from diminished eyesight and hearing. She also suffered 
from Parkinson's disease and diminished cognitive functioning. (R. 1680) 
. 14. In November 2012, Barbara fell and suffered serious injuries, including hip 
and humerous fractures. These injuries required Barbara to undergo serious surgery and to 
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take pam medication. The evidence indicates that, following her injuries, Barbara's 
physical and mental condition worsened. She became less mobile and less capable of 
accomplishing daily tasks of self-care. The increased stress negatively impacted the 
Parkinson's disease symptoms from which she suffered as well as her general cognitive 
functioning. (R. 1678) 
15. In the process of empowering Terry as an administrator of Barbara's 
decisions; Terry and Barbara visited Mr. Skabelund, Barbara's estate planning attorney. 
Mr. Skabelund was the one to suggest that Barbara sign an updated power of attorney 
docum~nt that would allow Terry to act for Barbara on personal matters. Mr. Skabelund 
noted that appointments such as this constitute a common part of the estate planning 
process, especially for elderly clients .. Mr.· Skabelund also testified that he had had no 
concern over Barbara's capacity to execute such a document. Accordingly, Mr. Skabelund 
drafted a General Power of Attorney designed to deal only with Barbara's personal assets-
not trust assets-which Barbara signed on December 17, 2012. (R. 1678-1679) 
16. Shortly after Barbara signed the General Power of Attorney, Terry and Mark 
Ellsworth ("Mark") began to correspond in order to set up a meeting to go over the 1991 
Trust documents and to discuss their probable future roles as co-trustees of that trust. Mark 
and Terry both testified that at this point their relationship was cordial and cooperative. (R. 
1678) 
17. Their meeting took place in early March 2013. During that meeting, Terry 
informed Mark that Barbara wished to sell Barbara's American Fork residence (which was 
owned by the 1991 Trust) because Barbara was no longer able to live there due to her 
7 
G 
physical condition and because the HOA rules would not permit her to rent the house. Terry 
also informed Mark of the power of attorney document that Barbara had signed in 
December 2012. At the end of that meeting, Mark told Terry that he wanted to discuss the 
sale of the American Fork residence with his other siblings who were contingent 
beneficiaries of the 1991 Trust. (R. 1678) 
18. The genesis of the dispute (as relates to the trust issues) stems from a 
subsequent email Mark sent to Terry on March 13, 2013. In that email Mark stated: 
Dear Terry, 
After we last met, I conveyed the information from our meeting to my 
siblings. I am writing this to summarize the consensus on how our family 
feels regarding the estate/trust. I would like to start by asking that you try to 
view this summary as if you were in our circumstances (Barbara passed away 
10 years ago, and I am in your position with Bud instead of you with 
Barbara). 
We as a family all believe caring for Barbs' needs is the top priority. In 
reviewing Barbs health condition, we feel that given her ongoing declining 
medical condition and memory as well as her chronic conditions of bipolar, 
DVT's and the recent diagnosis of Parkinson's and others, that she is not in 
a condition to manage any fiscal matters. We believe this supported in action 
by you, but the fact that you had Barbara sign over to you a power of attorney 
and are handling her fiscal affairs. 
In considering this we believe that the best way to proceed is to have Barbara 
officially resign from the trust (she has already defaulted by signing power 
of attorney over to you). This will place the fiscal aspects of the estate/trust 
into the manner it was planned for originally when the survivor of our parents 
was no longer able, and put responsibility legally into a joint partnership 
between you and me. 
After completing Barbs resignation you and I can get together to work out a 
joint relationship in managing the remaining assets of the estate/trust and 
Barbs ongoing care needs. If you do not have any objections to this direction, 
I would suggest we both meet with Barbara to discuss this and have her sign 
a resignation. 
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If you have reservations or disagreements, I would appreciate hearing them, 
so we can try to find an agreeable solution and continue our relationship in 
the affable fashion that currently exists. 
Sincerely, 
Mark Ellsworth 
(R. 1677-1678 and Trial Exhibit 8)3 
19. Terry understood this email as a threat and a demand that Barbara resign as 
trustee. (R. 1677) 
20. Terry only explained the email to Barbara, but did not show it to her. (R. 
1912 at page 49) 
21. The trial court found that Terry "overreacted to Mark's initial suggestion that 
Barbara step down as trustee .... " (R. 1651) 
22. After receiving this email, Terry contacted Mr. Skabelund, Barbara's estate 
planning attorney and arranged a meeting for the very next day, March 14, 2013. Terry and 
Mr. Skabelund both testified that Barbara requested the meeting· because she took offense 
to Mark's assertions that she should resign as trustee and that she had already forfeited that 
position. Barbara was also offended by the Ellsworth children's efforts to block the sale of 
the American Fork residence. Mr. Skabelund testified that these were Barbara's stated 
motivations for wanting to create the 2013 Trust documents. (R. 1677) 
23. Based on his consultations with Barbara, Mr. Skabelund drafted a new set of 
estate planning documents, including a will, another updated power of attorney document, 
3 Trial Exhibit 8 is contained in the Addendum. 
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and the 20 l 3 Trust. These new documents transferred 50% of the property from the l 99 l 
Trust to the 20 l 3 Trust and named only Barbara's biological children as beneficiaries. (R. 
1676-1677) 
22. The new estate plan was executed on March 19, 2013. The effect of the new 
trust was to diminish the Ellsworth siblings' interest in the property of the 1991 Trust. (R. 
1676) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Mark Ellsworth Parties contend two errors occurred at the trial level. First, 
Appellants claim the trial court erred when it determined, "A plain reading of the Will 
explains that Barbara is to receive Elmer's personal property which was not transferred to 
someone els_e or to the family trust." (R. at 1070.) The trial court concluded that because. -
the Will clearly transferred personal property to Barbara, and because Barbara possessed 
that personal property after Elmer's death, the statutory presumption of intestacy did not 
apply due to an exception found in Utah Code Ann. §75-3-102 which trumped the intestacy 
presumption. The Mark Ellsworth parties however contend that the trial court 
vi/d misinterpreted that Will and there is no "plain meaning" transferring the Precious Metals 
to Barbara upon which the trial court could rely upon to allow application of Section 102. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that (1) the presumption of intestacy was 
rebutted and (2) by trru:isferring ownership of all of the personal property to Barbara. 
Second, Appellants contend the trial court erred when it determined that the creation 
of the 2013 Trust was fair and therefore the presumption of undue influence did not apply. 
The trial court found that, "Barbara had her own personal motivations to create the estate 
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plan because she was upset with Mark and others of the Ellsworth children." The evidence 
at trial, however, as well as the trial court's own findings, establish that Barbara was upset 
from what she heard from Terry. The trial court determined that, "Terry overreacted to 
Mark's initial suggestion that Barbara step down as trustee .... " If the reason for Barbara 
to change her estate plan was based on Terry's overreaction to what Mark had suggested, 
then Barbara's changes were not based on accurate information. Accordingly, the estate 
planning changes were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly influenced by 
Terry's overreaction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES BASED ON THE 
DETERMINATION THAT BARBARA BECAME THE OWNER OF THE 
PRECIOUS METALS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-3-102 
Section 75-3-107 of the Uniform Utah Probate Code ("UUPC") states in relevant 
part that, "No informal probate proceeding or formal ~estacy proceeding ... may be 
commenced more than three years after the decedent's death" unless certain limited 
exceptions apply. None of the referenced exceptions to extend the t4ree year period apply 
to the facts of this case. The three year limitations period, however, does not apply to 
proceedings to determine the heirs of an intestate. Id. Subpart (3) of§ 75-3-107 indicates: 
If no will is probated within three years from death, the presumption 
of intestacy is final and the court shall upon filing a proper petition enter an 
order to that effect. The court also has continuing jurisdiction to: 
(a) determine what property was owned by the decedent at the 
time of death, and 
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(b) appoint a personal representative or special administrator to 
administer the decedent's estate. 
Based on the above, the presumption that Elmer died intestate should have become 
final three years after his death when no probate proceeding was filed. Also, at the time 
Elmer's death, he had a surviving spouse and surviving descendants who were not 
surviving descendants of his surviving spouse. Section 7 5-2-102( I )(b) governs how estate 
~ assets should be distributed in this circumstance: "(a) The intestate share of decedent's 
surviving spouse is ... (b) the first $50,000.004 plus½ of the balance of the intestate estate, 
if one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving 
spouse." The remaining balance would pass by intestacy to Elmer's children. At the time 
the presumption of intestacy became final, Barbara would have been entitled to receive the 
first $50,000 of any estate assets (subject to offsets set forth in the UUPC) plus one-half of 
the remaining balance, and the Mark Ellsworth Parties should have received the other half. 
In summary, because Elmer's Will has never been probated, there is a conclusive legal 
presumption that that Elmer died intestate and the property owned by Elmer at the time of 
his death, as a matter of law, should be passed to his heirs via Utah's intestacy statute. 
The trial court, however, found that§ 75-3-102 provided an exception to the final 
presumption of intestacy. This section provides: 
Except as provided in Section 75-3-1201, to be effective to prove the transfer 
of any property or to nominate a personal representative, a will must be 
declared to be valid by an order of informal probate by the registrar, or an 
adjudication of probate by the court, except that a duly executed and 
4 The 20 IO amendment to this provision, effective May 11, 2010, substituted "$7 5 .000" 
for $50,000" in (l)(b). The $50,000.00 amount was the operative amount at the time 
Elmer passed away. 
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unrevoked will which has not been probated may be admitted as evidence of 
a devise if both: 
( l) no court proceeding concerning the succession or administration of 
the estate has occurred; and 
(2) either the devisee or the devisee's successors and assigns possessed 
the property devised in accordance with the provisions of the will, or the 
property devised was not possessed or claimed by anyone by virtue of the 
decedent's title during the time period for testacy proceedings. 
After construing this section, the trial court determined, "The restrictions that Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-120 I places on wills that have not been declared valid through an order 
of informal probate do not apply to Elmer's will. Barbara had all the precious metals 
because (1) there was no probate, (2) she possessed the property, i.e. the precious metals 
when Elmer died." (R. 1087) To reach this conclusion, the trial court determined that 
Elmer's statement, "If my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal Property 
( as hereinafter defined)" clearly and unambiguously conveyed the Precious Metals to 
Barbara. The district court substantiated this position by making the following statements: 
Elmer's will leaves the reader anticipating a list of personal property 
that will specifically be transfer [sic] to Barbara upon Elmer's death. Elmer 
never made that list. He did convey property to the trust, but he did not 
convey all of his personal property to- the trust. Even though Elmer does not 
define the words "Personal Property," the term is susceptible to construing it 
by its plain meaning. As a result, it can be assumed that Elmer's intent 
concerning the distribution of his personal property is the same as the 
conclusion a plain meaning of the Will communicates. 
A plain reading of the Will explains that Barbara is to receive Elmer's 
personal property which was not transferred to someone else or to the family 
trust. Elmer's exclusion, purposeful or not, of precious metals or possibly 
other items of personal property that was: to be transferred to the trust does 
not authorize the court to make a new will to conform to what the court thinks 
that testator may have intended, but the intent of the testator must be 
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ascertained from the Will as it stands. This, even if the Will were effective, 
it would not transfer the precious metals into the trust. 
(R. 1069-1070) 
From its Ruling, the trial court appears to have determined that the Precious Metals 
passed to Barbara because "[a] plain reading of the Will explains that Barbara is to receive 
Elmer's personal property" and "[Barbara] possessed the property, i.e. the precious metals 
when Elmer died." 
It is not disputed that Barbara possessed the Precious Metals after Elmer died. 
Appellants, however, contend the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it determined 
that the Will plainly devised the Precious Metals to Barbara~ The Mark Ellsworth parties 
believe the trial court did not give appropriate weight to the "as hereinafter defined" 
language which is contained in the Will. 
There are at least two reasonable interpretations that can be gleaned from the "as 
hereinafter defined" language. First, there is the trial court's interpretation that the 
reference to "Personal Property" means all •personal property owned by Elmer at this death 
would be passed to Barbara. 
Appellants believe there is another reasonable interpretation. Given the fact that 
Elmer used this specific language in his Will, there must be some meaning applied to it. 
The term "Personal Property" is capitalized,and the context of the language of the Will can 
reasonably be read to mean that "Personal Property" means something narrower or 
different than the standard meaning of personal property, otherwise including this language 
would be redundant. 
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It can reasonably be interpreted that Paragraph Fourth contemplates a writing that 
would define or designate what is meant by the term "Personal Property." A reasonable 
person could interpret paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will as follows: ( l) If Barbara 
survives Elmer, then Elmer will give Barbara all items of "Personal Property" which are 
specifically defined by Elmer; (2) Since no items of "Personal Property" were ever defined 
by Elmer, he must have intended that no specific items of "Personal Property" would pass 
directly to Barbara; and (3) Since no items of Personal Property passed directly to Barbara, 
the non-defined personal property would pass to the 1991 Trust pursuant to paragraph Fifth 
which indicates, "I give my residuary estate to the Trustee of then acting under that certain 
Trust Agreement named THE ELLSWORTH FAMILY TRUST created on the 1st day of 
May, 1991.. .. " Notably, the term "My residuary estate" is defined in the Will to include all 
of Elmer's interest in "personal property." (Trial Exhibit I at page 11) 
Based on competing reasonable interpretations of the Will, the question becomes 
whether it was Elmer's intent to convey all of his traditionally defined "personal property" 
to Barbara, or was it his intent that any "Personal Property" he did not specifically designate 
would pass to the 1991 Trust via the pour over provisions of Paragraph Fifth. This 
distinction is important because if the Will can reasonably be construed as devising the 
Precious Metals to the 1991 Trust, rather than Barbara, then the condition relied upon the 
trial court in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-102 (devisee possessed the property devised in 
accordance with the provisions of the will) has not been met. If the conditions in § 75-3-
102 have not been met, then the final presumption of intestacy is complete, and Elmer's 
prope11y should pass to his heirs via the law of intestate succession. 
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The Comment to § 3-102 of the Unifom1 Probate Code states in relevant part, "If 
there has been no proceeding in probate, persons seeking to establish title by an unprobated 
will must show, with reference to the estate they claim, either that it has been possessed by 
those to whom it was devised or that it has been unknown to the decedent's heirs or devisees 
and not possessed by any." This Comment serves to confirm the position that Barbara was 
only entitled to the benefit of § 7 5-3-102 if she was the specific devisee of the Precious 
Metals µnder the terms of the Will. 
If it cannot be determined who was the properly named devisee by a plain reading 
of the Will, then an ambiguity exists. If an ambiguity exists, the trial court should have 
resorted to extrinsic evidence to determine Elmer's intent regarding who he desired to 
receive the Precious Metals. 
Appellants contend the question (which is a question of law) is whether this 
language in the Will is ambiguous. In DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielsen, 220 P .3d 178 (Utah 
Ct App. 2009), this Court stated: 
A contract is "ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies." Daines, 2008 UT 51, ~ 25 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "[B]efore permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make 
a determination of facial ambiguity" within the contractual language. Id "[If 
the language of the contract is ambiguous such that the intentions of the 
parties cannot be determined by the plain language of the agreement, extrinsic 
evidence must be" considered to determine the parties' intentions. Novell, Inc. 
v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, ,I 20, 92 P.3d 768 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 16 n .19 (stating 
that where a contract is "obviously incomplete on its face parol evidence is 
necessary for filling of gaps" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ambiguity 
may be found when a contract is missing an essential term. See Daines, 2008 
UT 51, ,r 29 (stating that finding ambiguity is not limited to express 
contractual terms but may also be found "where there are missing terms in a 
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contract" (citing Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 1 14, 78 P.3d 600)). 
"[W]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence 
must be considered. '1 Id. iI 26. But parol evidence may not be used "to obscure 
otherwise plain contractual terms,'1 for determining what a contract means 
"begins and ends with the language of the contract." Id. 1 30. Therefore, all 
interpretations inferred from extrinsic evidence must be "1reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract."' Id. ,r 26 ( quoting Ward v. 
lntermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995)). 
Appellants contest the trial court's legal conclusion that the Will plainly indicates it 
was Elmer's intent to devise the Precious Metals to Barbara, and that as a consequence 
thereof, that Barbara became the owner of the Precious Metals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-102. Given that more than one reasonable interpretation of the Will is available, the 
Court erred when it relied on § 75-3-102 in determining Barbara owned the Precious 
Metals. The granting of summary judgment when a question of material fact about Elmer's 
intent was still in question was inappropriate. Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. The decision of the 
trial court on this issue should be reversed and lower court should hear parol evidence on 
Elmer's intent regarding the proper devisee of the Will. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED 
APPELLEES REBUTTED THE PRESUMPTION THAT BARBARA'S 
CREATION,OF THE 2013 TRUST WAS UNFAIR 
At trial, the Mark Ellsworth parties asserted a claim that Barbara was unduly 
influenced to create the 2013 Trust. Under Utah law, undue influence is presumed when a 
"confidential relationship" exists between the trust or will creator and the beneficiary of 
the will or trust. Estate of loupe v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 1994). The existence 
of a confidential relationship is generally a question of fact. In re Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 
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345, 347 (Utah App. 1988). In this case, the trial court expressly found a confidential 
relationship existed between Barbara and Terry. (R. 1659) 
Where a confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which 
must be overcome by countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the defendant to 
prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell, 
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983) (finding of undue influence in execution of trust shifted burden 
to defendant to prove absence of undue influence in a subsequent alleged ratification of the 
trust); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah.2d 40, 337 P.2d 420, 422 (1959). Moreover, when a 
confidential relationship exists, and a transaction occurs that benefits the one in whom the 
confidence is placed, a presumption arises that the transaction is unfair. See, e.g. Bradbury 
v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah.2d 378,383,401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the benefitting 
party the burden to persuade the court that there was no fraud or undue influence exercised 
toward the other. In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah.2d 277, 293, 293 P.2d 682,693 (1956). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized in a case of this sort it is not usually 
possible to procure direct evidence of the statements and conduct which one accused of 
vJU undue influence has used on the deceased person. One of the two is dead; the other cannot 
be expected to give evidence against herself. The usual way to prove this type of case is to 
provide the surrounding circumstances from which deductions may be made. In re 
Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Utah 1935). The Utah Supreme Court 
has also stated, " ... undue influence is seldom the subject of direct proof, but, as a general 
rule, must be established by inferences and circumstances ... " In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 
207,167 P. 256,261 (Utah 1917). 
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The trial court expressly found a confidential relationship existed between Terry 
and Barbara. Based on this finding, the burden then shifted to the Appellees to show that 
Barbara's transfer from the 199 l Trust to the 2013 Trust was fair. 
The trial court found that Appellees rebutted the presumption of undue influence by 
showing, "Barbara had her own personal motivations to create the estate plan because she 
was upset with Mark and others of the Ellsworth children." (R. 1658) The trial court 
appareritly founded its determination of Barbara's motivations on the testimony of Terry 
and Mr. Skabelund. (R. 1677) The lower court found that Barbara took offense to Mark's 
assertions that she should resign as trustee and that she had already forfeited that position. 
Additionally, the trial court determined that Barbara was also offended by tpe Ellsworth 
children's efforts to block the sale of the American Fork residence. Mr. Skabelund testified 
that these were Barbara's stated motivations for wanting to create the 2013 Trust 
documents. Id. 
The evidence presented at trial established there was a very limited window between 
the time when Barbara became upset and when she completed the 2013 Trust. It is 
undisputed that the March 13, 2013 email was the event which triggered the 2013 Trust to 
be created on March 19, 2013. 
While its possible different conclusions regarding the intent of the March 13, 2013 
could be made by different readers, the trial court expressly found that Terry overreacted 
to that email. Terry's perception regarding that email is important. Terry believed the email 
contained a "threat" and "demand that Barbara resign as Trustee." It is highly significant 
that Terry did not show the email to Barbara, but Terry presumably conveyed to Barbara 
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her understanding that Mark had made a threat and demand that Barbara resign. From this 
point forward, Barbara was acting on what Terry had told her. Consequently, it must be 
shown that what Terry was telling Barbara was accurate. Where Barbara only received 
information about the email from Terry, and given the trial court's conclusion that Terry 
overreacted to the email, it must follow that Barbara based her decision to create the 2013 
Trust was founded on Terry's overreaction. It is fundamentally unfair that Barbara made 
decisions based upon an overreaction from Terry. This is especially true where Terry had 
much to gain and the Ellsworth children had much to lose. 
With regard to the claim that Barbara was upset that the Mark Ellsworth Parties tried 
to stop the sale of her residence, it is significant that nowhere in the email ( or in the record) 
is there evidence that the Mark Ellsworth parties sought to stop the sale of the Barbara's 
home prior to the time 2013 Trust was created. There is no basis for such a finding in the 
record. 
In order to rebut the presumption of unfairness, it was incumbent that the Appellees 
establish that Terry accurately conveyed the content of the email to Barbara. A fair reading 
~ of the March 13, 2013 email shows that Mark was simply exploring solutions. He was not 
making threats or demands. In fact, the very last paragraph of the email clearly establishes 
that Mark was exploring options. The last paragraph states, "If you have reservations or 
disagreements, I would appreciate hearing them, so we can try to find an agreeable solution 
and continue our relationship in the affable fashion that currently exists." What Barbara 
heard, however, was Terry's understanding of a threat and demand. 
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The evidence at trial establishes that Barbara was relying on what TeITy told her, 
and not the March 13, 2013 email itself. Thus, to rebut the presumption of unfairness, there 
must be some showing that Barbara was not acting on Terry's overreaction to the email. 
Because that evidence does not exist in the record, the only conclusion that can be reached 
is Barbara was acting on Terry's overreaction. Accordingly, the estate planning changes 
were fundamentally unfair because Barbara was unduly influenced by Terry's 
overreaction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellants request that this Court reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment determination that the Precious Metals were properly Barbara's 
pursuant to§ 75-3-102. It .. is not clear from a reading of the Will whether Elmer intended 
that Barbara or the 1991 Trust should receive the Precious Metals. Because of that lack of 
clarity, it cannot properly be concluded that Barbara was the devisee of the Precious 
Metals. If Barbara was not devisee of the Precious Metals, then the Court improperly relied 
on§ 75-2-102 in concluding that Barbara was the owner of the Precious Metals. 
Additionally, the trial court erred when it determined Appellees rebutted the 
presumption of unfairness of Barbara creating the 2013 Trust. While the evidence at trial 
established Barbara created the 2013 Trust because she was angry at one or more of the 
Ellsworth children, the evidence and findings of the trial court also establishes that Barbara 
was only acting on information she received from Terry! The trial court found Terry had 
overreacted. Where Barbara did not see the actual email, but only received Terry's 
understanding that it contained a "threat" and a "demand," the record can only support a 
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finding that Barbara acted on Terry's overreaction and not on independent review of the 
email itself. 
Appellants respectfully respect that the Court reverse the summary judgment 
decision and remand this matter for further proceeding to determine Elmer's intent 
regarding the beneficiary of his Will. Additionally, Appellants request that this Court 
reverse. the trial court's determination that Appellees appropriately rebutted the 
presumption of unfairness and direct the trial court to enter a finding that presumption of 
undue influence was not rebutted by the Appellees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
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Ruic 56, Utah R. Civ. P. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim 
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 21 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party. move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
in accordance vvith Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
( d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole ca.se or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
( e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this mle, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justi(y the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-2-102. Intestate share of spouse. 
( 1) The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is: 
(a) the entire intestate estate if: 
(i) no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or 
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving 
spouse; 
(b) the first $50,000, plus 1/2 of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of 
the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b), if the intestate estate passes to both the 
decedent's surviving spouse and to other heirs, then any nonprobate transfer, as defined in 
Section 75-2-206, received by the surviving spouse is chargeable against the intestate 
share of the surviving spouse. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-102. Necessity of order of probate for will. 
Except as provided in Section 75-3-1201, to be effective to prove the transfer of any 
property or to nominate a personal representative, a will must be declared to be valid by 
an order of informal probate by the registrar, or an adjudication of probate by the court, 
except that a duly executed and unrevoked will which has not been probated may be 
admitted as evidence of a devise if both: 
( 1) no court proceeding concerning the succession or administration of the estate has 
occurred;and · 
(2) either the devisee or the devisee's successors and assigns possessed the property 
devised in accordance with the provisions of the _will, or the property devised was not 
possessed or claimed by anyone by virtue of the decedent's title during the time period for 
testacy proceedings. · 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. Probate, testacy, and appointment proceedings --
Ultimate time limit -- Presumption and order of intestacy. 
(I) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator's 
domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a 
prior appointment, may be commenced more tlun three years after the decedent's death, 
except: 
(a) If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact of the 
decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be 
maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that the decedent's death occurred prior 
to the initiation of the previous proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed 
unduly in initiating the subsequent proceeding. 
(b) Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be maintained in 
relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing person for whose estate a 
conservator has been appointed, at any time within three years after the conservator 
becomes able to establish the death of the protected person. 
( c) A proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure appointment of 
the person with legal priority for appointment in the event the contest is successful, may 
be commenced within the later of twelve months from the informal probate or three years 
from the decedent's death. 
(2) The limitations provided in Subsection (I) do not apply to proceedings to construe 
probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In cases under Subsection (l)(a) or (b), 
the date on which a testacy or appointment proceeding is properly commenced shall be 
deemed to be the date of the decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions 
of this title which relate to the date of death. 
(3) If no will is probated within three· years from death, the presumption of intestacy is 
final and the court shall enter arf order to that effect and provide for the distribution of the 
decedent's prope1iy in accordance with the laws of intestacy under Title 75, Chapter 2, 
Part 1, The court has continuing jurisdiction to handle all matters necessary to dis'tribute 
the decedent's prope1iy, including jurisdiction to determine what property was owned by 
the decedent at the time of death. 
Uniform Probate Code§ 3-102. Necessity of Order of Probate for Will. 
Except as provided in Section 3..:1201, to be effective to prove the transfer of any property 
or to nominate an executor, a will must be declared to be valid by an order of informal 
probate by the Registrar, or an adjudication of probate by the court. 
Comment 
The basic idea of this section follows Section 85 of the Model Probate Code (1946). 
The exception referring to Section 3-1201 relates to affidavit procedures which are 
authorized for collection of estates worth -less than $5,000. 
se·ction 3-107 and various sections in Parts 3 and 4 of this article make it clear that 
a will may be probated without appointment of a personal representative, including any 
nominated by the will. 
r~·., 
~ 
The requirement of probate stated here and the limitations on probate provided in 
Section 3-108 mean that questions as to testacy may be eliminated simply by the naming 
of time. Under these sections, an informally probated will cannot he questioned atler the 
later of three years from the decedent's death or one year from the probate whether or not 
an executor was appointed, or, if an executor was appointed., without regard to whether the 
estate has been distributed. If the decedent is believed to have died without a will, the 
running of three years from death bars probate of a late-discovered will and so makes the 
assumption of intestacy conclusive. 
The exceptions to the section ( other than the exception relevant to small estates) are 
not intended to accommodate cases of late-discovered wills. Rather, they are designed to 
make the probate requirement inapplicable where circumstances led survivors of a 
decedent to believe that there was no point to probating a will of which they may have had 
knowledge. If any will was probated within three years of death, or if letters of 
administration were issued in this period, the exceptions to the section are inapplicable. If 
there has been no proceeding in probate, persons seeking to establish title by an unprobated 
will must show, with reference to the estate they claim, either that it has been possessed by 
those to whom it was devised or that it has been unknown to the decedent's heirs or 
devisees and not possessed by any. 
It is to be noted, also, that devisees who.are able to claim under one of the exceptions 
to this section may not obtain probate of the will or administration of the estate to assist 
them in their efforts to obtain the estate in question. The exceptions are to a rule which bars 
admission of a will into evidence, rather than to the section barring late probate and late 
appointment of personal representatives. Still, the exceptions should serve to prevent two 
"hard" cases which can be imagined readily. In one, a surviving spouse fails to seek probate 
of a will giving her the entire estate of the decedent because she is informed or believes 
that all of her husband's property was held by them jointly, with right of survivorship. 
Later, it is discovered that she was mistaken as to the nature of her husband's title. The 
other case involves a devisee who sees no point to securing probate of a will in his favor 
because he is unaware of any estate. Subsequently, valuable rights of the decedent are 
discovered. 
In 1993, a technical amendment removed a two-pronged exception formerly 
occupying about 8 lines of text in the official text. The removed language permitted 
unprobated wills to be admitted in evidence in two limited categories of cases in which 
failure to probate a will within three years of the testator's death were deemed to be 
justified. The I 993 technical amendment to Section 3-108 so limits the three year time bar 
on probate and appointment proceedings as to make the Section 3-102 exception 
unnecessary. 
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This matter came before the Court for trial on September 3, 4, 5, and 18, 2014. The Court 
received evidence and testimony, along with dozens of received exhibits which include 
deposition transcripts, financial records, correspondence between the parties, medical reports, 
legally operative documents such as estate planning documents and related documents, and other 
evidence. The Court also heard the arguments of counsel through opening statements as well as 
opening and closing trial briefs. Based upon the consideration of all of the evidence, the Court 
now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties stipulated to file 
proposed findings and conclusions and/or closing argwnents in writing by October 6, 2014, after 
which the matter would be submitted for decision. 
Introduction 
· The primary issue in this case is the proper ownership of certain assets, including a six-
plex, a residence located in American Fork, and an investment account located at Wedbush 
Securities. On April I, 2014, the Court ruled on a partial motion for summary judgment 
regarding the ownership of certain precious metals. This Order also resolves any remaining 
dispute surrounding these precious metals. 
A secondary issue of this litigation concerns who should act as trustee of the 1991 Trust 
and whether Mark Ellsworth or Terry Huffstatler have breached any duties in their capacities as 
trustees. 
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The Mark Ellsworth parties I seek to show that Barbara Ellsworth lacked legal capacity on 
March 19, 2013 when she executed docwnents which created the 2013 Trust, transferring 50% of 
the 1991 Trust's ownership in the six-plex, the American Fork residence, and the Wedbush 
account to the 2013 Trust. The Mark Ellsworth parties also seek to show that the March 2013 
trust documents are invalid as being procured by the undue influence of Barbara's children. It is 
also the position of the Mark Ellsworth parties that the transfers were void due to Terry's conflict 
of interest. The Mark Ellsworth parties also want Terry removed as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. 
Finally, they seek attorney fees and costs. 
The Terry Huffstatler parties2 dispute the contentions that Barbara lacked capacity to 
execute the 2013 Trust, that the transfer documents were procured by undue influence, and that 
the transfers were void due to any conflict of interest. The Terry Huffstatler parties want Mark 
removed as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust due to mismanagement of trust assets. They seek an 
order enforcing Barbara's 2013 estate planning documents. They also seek attorney fees and 
costs. 
1 The "Mark Ellsworth parties" include Mark Ellsworth, individually and as a Co-
Trustee, Andrew Ellsworth, Michelle Thomas, Ken Ellsworth, Tami Jasper, and Tim Ellsworth. 
2 The "Terry Huffstatler parties" include Terry Huffstatler, individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Barbara Ellsworth and as Co-Trustee, Terry Huffstatler, Jim 
Huffstatler, Karl Baker, and Kieth Baker. 
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1. Events surrounding the dispute. All of the issues in this case arise from the 
implementation and administration of two trusts: The Ell worth Family Trust created in May 
1991 (" 1991 Trust") and the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust created in March 2013 ("2013 
Trust"). The Court notes that no party has alleged ambiguity in either trust instrument. Upon 
review of the language of the trusts, found in Exhibits 1 and 21, the Court has confirmed that, to 
the extent it is relevant to any present issues, the trusts' language is unambiguous and therefore 
their provisions can be interpreted and applied as a matter of law. 
2. On May 1, 1991, Elmer and Barbara Ellsworth executed a Trust Agreement that created 
the 1991 Trust, with the assistance of attorney Steve Skabelund. The 1991 Trust was notarized 
contemporaneously with its execution. (Exhibit 1.) 
3. Elmer and Barbara executed a Warranty Deed that transferred two parcels ofproperty-
the marital home and a six plex-to the 1991 Trust. After Elmer's death, an investment account 
at Wedbush Securities, Inc. was created to be held by Barbara as the trustee of the 1991 Trust.4 
4. Sections 9 .1 and 9 .2 of the 1991 Trust provide for the appointment of successor trustees 
upon the death of one or both of the Ellsworths: 
9.1 Appointment. The Trustors hereby nominate and appoint ELMER A. ELLSWORTH 
and BARBARA MAY ELLSWORTH, as Trustees of this Trust. If either of them resigns 
3 To the extent that the Court's findings of fact are more properly chara~terized ~ 
conclusions of law, they should be deemed as such. To the extent that the Court's conclusions of 
law are more properly characterized as findings of fact, they should be deemed as such. 
4 The parties stipulated as to the balance of the Wedbush account, which was $53,331.72 
as of September 2, 2014. 
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or fails to serve for any reason, the remaining initial Trustee shall serve as the sole 
Trustee hereunder. 
9.2 Appointment of Successor. (a) Upon the death, incapacity, resignation or discharge of 
both Trustees, then the following individuals shall serve as Successor Co-Trustees: 
TERRY ANN BAKER HUFFSTATLER and MARK L. ELLSWORTH. (b) Any Trustee 
or Successor Trustee may resign by instrument in writing. 
5. When Elmer passed away on February 7, 2003, Barbara became the sole trustee and 
primary beneficiary of the 1991 Trust. As the primary beneficiary, she became entitled to the 
entire net income and as much of the trust principal as was necessary for her support and 
maintenance: 
7.1 Family Trust: Lifetime Distributions. (a) During the lifetime ofth~ surviving Trustor, 
the Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the Surviving Trustor the entire net 
income of the Family.Trust, in quarterly or more frequent installments. In addition, if the 
Trustee deems the net income to be insufficient for the reasonable support and 
maintenance of the Surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay to or apply for his or her 
benefit as much of the principal of the Family Trust as the Trustee, in the Trustee's 
discretion, deems necessary for such limited purposes. 
(b) In any calendar year the Trustee shall also pay over to the Surviving Trustor from the 
principal of this Family Trust such amounts as the Surviving Trustor shall request in 
writing [subject to specific limitations set forth within this section]. 
6. The 1991 Trust named seven of Elmer's biological children and three of Barbara's 
biological children as contingent beneficiaries, all of whom are parties to this action with the 
exception of one of Elmer's children who passed away before Barbara's death. 
7. During the several years preceding Barbara's death in December 2013, she lived in 
various stages of ailing physical and mental health. 
8. ~ollowing Elmer's death, Terry Huffstatler, Barbara's daughter, took on the role of 
caring for and assisting her mother with the daily tasks of living. 
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9. As Barbara's years advanced, Terry's role required an increasing amount of attention and 
effort. At trial Terry testified that she had almost daily contact with Barbara. For the 3 years 
preceding Barbara's death, Terry attended most if not all of Barbara's doctor appointments. 
IO. Barbara suffered from diminished eyesight and hearing. She also suffered from 
Parkinson's disease and diminished cognitive functioning. 
11. While she was trustee, Barbara did not have any complex or detailed management 
responsibilities. She did not manage the Wedbush account, and her step-son, Mark Ellsworth, 
managed the six-plex.5 Barbara lived in the American Fork residence and paid her personal and 
house-related bills. 6 Per the term~ of the trust, she received a payment every month from the net 
income that the six-plex generated· and deposited that money into her personal checking account. 
Barbara used an accountant every year to reconcile the trust's assets and to file taxes. Her trustee 
5 Mark has acted as manager of the six-plex for several years. His responsibilities have 
included renting the property, collecting rents, and providing maintenance. He receives $400.00 
per month for the services he provides. Until May 2013, Mark paid Barbara a monthly amount 
from the six-plex proceeds. Pe,r the terms oftµe trust, B~bara set the amount, the most recent of 
which was $1,800.00 per month. He stopped making payments to Barbara in May 2013, and he 
testified that he used the income from the six-pl ex to pay for repairs to that property. 
,.,.. ~ ' - ' 
6 The parties agree that there is an unresolved. title history issue with the American Fork 
residence, but that, in the interests of efficiency and finality, the American Fork residence should 
be included in the corpus of the 1991 Trust. This will allow the Court to consider the disputed 
validity of Barbara Ellsworth's transfer of her beneficial interest in the American Fork residence 
without reference to its clouded title history. For the·purposes of this trial, the parties and the 
Court will consider the residence to have been viably transferred many years before this 
litigation began. The parties agree that the Court should enter whatever quiet title orders will be 
necessary to effectuate its ultimate determination of ownership of this property. 
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responsibilities were associated with her routine tasks of day-to-day living and did not require 
her to possess any special expertise. 
12. In November 2012, Barbara fell and suffered serious injuries, including hip and 
humerous fractures. These injuries required Barbara to undergo serious surgery and to take pain 
medication. The evidence indicates that, following her injuries, Barbara's physical and mental 
condition worsened. She became less mobile and less capable of accomplishing daily tasks of 
self-care~ The increased stress negatively impacted the Parkinson's disease symptoms from 
which she suffered as well as her general cognitive functioning. 
13. Terry's responsibilities in her role as her mother's caretaker increased substantially 
during this time. As a result, Barbara empowered Terry to administer and execute tasks on her 
behalf, including writing checks and other financial management activities. The Court notes that 
both Mark and Marilyn Ellsworth acknowledged that they knew that Barbara relied greatly on 
Terry1 until March 2013, the Ellsworth siblings seem to have welcomed or at least accepted 
Terry's access to and daily collaboration with Barbara. 
14. In the process of empowering Terry as an administrator of Barbara's decisions, Terry and 
Barbara visited Mr. Skabelund, Barbara's estate planning attorney. The unrebutted testimony at 
trial was that Mr. Skabelund was the one to suggest that Barbara sign an updated power of 
attorney document that would allow Terry to act for Barbara on personal matters.7 During his 
7 Barbara's 1991 estate planning documents had also appointed Terry as Barbara's 
attorney-in-fact. 
Page 7 of 41 
001679 
trial testimony, Mr. Skabelund8 noted that appointments such as this constitute a common part of 
the estate planning process, especially for elderly clients. Mr. Skabelund also testified that he had 
had no concern over Barbara's capacity to execute such a document. Accordingly, Mr. 
Skabelund drafted a General Power of Attorney designed to deal only with Barbara's personal 
assets-not trust assets-which Barbara signed on December 17, 2012. 
15. Shortly after Barbara signed the General Power of Attorney, Terry and Mark began to 
correspond in order to set up a meeting to go over the 1991 Trust documents and to discuss their 
probable future roles as co-trustees of that trust. Mark and Terry both testified that at this point 
their relationship was cordial and cooperative. 
16.'"Their meeting took place in early March 2013. During that meeting, Terry informed 
Mark.that Barbara wished to sell the American Fork residence because she was no longer able to 
live there due to her physical .condition and,because the HOA rules would not permit her to rent 
the house. Terry also informed Mark of the power of attorney document that Barbara had signed 
in December 2012. At the end of that meeting, Mark told Terry that he wanted to discuss the sale 
of the American Fork residence with his other siblings who were contingent beneficiaries of the 
1991 Trust. 
17. The genesis of the present dispute stems from a subsequent email Mark sent to Terry on 
March 13, 2013, wherein he requested that Barbara resign as trustee of the 1991 Trust. In that 
email M~k stated, 
8 This court only considered Mr. Skabelund's testimony as a fact witness. As to Mr. 
Skabelund' s assertions as to the legal effect of any document, including those he prepared, such 
legal conclusions are solely for the Court to determine. 
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We as a family all believe caring for [Barbara's] needs is the top priority. In reviewing 
[Barbara's] health condition, we feel that given her ongoing declining medical condition 
and memory as well as her chronic conditions of bipolar, DVT's and the recent diagnosis 
of Parkinson's that she is not in a condition to manage the fiscal affairs of the trust. We 
believe this is supported in action by you, by the fact that you had Barbara sign over to -
you a power of attorney and are handling her fiscal affairs. 
(Exhibit 8.)9 
18. Terry understood this email as a threat and a demand that Barbara resign as trustee. 
19. After receiving this email, Terry contacted Mr. Skabelund and arranged a meeting for the 
very next day, March 14, 2013. Terry and Mr. Skabelund both testified that Barbara requested 
the meeting because she took offense to Mark's assertions that she should resign as trustee and 
that she had already forfeited that position. Barbara was also offended by the Ellsworth 
children's efforts to block the sale of the American Fork residence. Mr. Skabelund testified that 
these were Barbara's stated motivations for wanting to create the 2013 Trust documents. 
20. Based on his consultations with Barbara, Mr. Skabelund drafted a new set of estate 
planning documents, including a will, another updated power of attorney docwnent, and the 
Barbara May Ellsworth Trust ("2013 Trust"). These new documents transferred 50% of the 
9 Elsewhere in that same March 13, 2013 email, Mark asserts that Barbara "defaulted,, 
her position as trustee by granting Terry a power of attorney. The Court finds that this assertion 
is without legal merit as there exists no trust provision supporting that proposition. Indeed, the 
1991 Trust actually includes a power of attorney designation. This indicates that the Trustors 
contemplated the possibility that an individual could serve as trustee despite such a designation. 
Further, Section 11.1 of the 1991 Trust provides a mechanism for a determination of trustee 
capacity. The reasons why the Ellsworth parties failed to rely on this mechanism to determine 
Barbara's capacity to serve as trustee remain unclear to the Court. 
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property from the 1991 Trust to the 2013 Trust and named only Barbara's biological children as 
beneficiaries. 
21. At that March 14, 2013 meeting, Barbara signed a new power of attorney designation 
which named Terry as her agent. In contrast to the power of attorney designation signed by 
Barbara three months earlier, this power of attorney also gave Terry the authority to withdraw 
assets from the 1991 Trust in accordance with the terms of the 1991 Trust. (Exhibit 16.) 
22. The new estate plan was executed on March 19, 2013. The effect of the new trust was to 
diminish the Ellsworth siblings' interest in the property of the 1991 Trust. All of this was done 
without consulting the Ellsworth children and without their knowledge. Irrespective of the 
validity of these transfers, the Court finds that these actions served to exacerbate the existing 
tensions between Barbara's children and Elmer's children. 
23. What follows is a series of escalations from each set of siblings which would eventually 
culminate in long, arduous, and expensive litigation. On the evening of March 19, after the new 
estate planning documents had been executed, Terry responded to Mark's March 13 email: 
I have had time to review your email that you sent on March 13th. 
In response, my brothers and I discussed this matter with our Mother and she stated that 
she will not resign from the family trust. She also requested that the keys to the safe 
deposit boxes be returned to me, along with the [six-plex] tax information for the year 
2012 within 5 days. · · 
(Exhibit 40.) 
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24. At trial, Mark's wife Marilyn Ellsworth testified that, in reaction to this email, Mark 
feared that Terry would use her power of attorney to improperly manage assets of the 1991 Trust 
and damage the Ellsworth siblings' interest in the trust property. 10 
25. On the morning of March 21, 2013, Mark and his sister Tami Jasper visited Barbara in 
her home. Mark and Tami both described the interaction during their trial testimony. Mark stated 
that he and Tami decided to go visit Barbara to gauge whether she was open to the idea of 
resigning. Tami and Mark both testified that the visit was cordial. During the course of that visit, 
Mark and Tami presented Barbara with a written resignation document that Mark's attorney, 
John Buckley, had prepared. 
26. At trial Tami described Barbara as being "on a teeter-totter" about signing the document, 
but that Barbara finally decided to sign the document once Tami walked over to a picture of 
Jesus Christ in Barbara's room and asked Barbara to consider what Jesus would do if he were in 
Barbara's situation. 
27. Having passed away, Barbara could not testify. Tami and Mark's testimony conflicts 
with the testimony offereQ by Terry and her daughte_r, Tina Miller, who testified that Barbara 
indicated that the meeting was ~uch_ more confrontational than Mark and Tami describe. Their 
10 The evidence and testimony presented at trial lead the Court to conclude that from this 
time forward, all parties in this matter acted prim~ly in their own self-interest and not in the 
interests of Barbara and of family unity, with the exception of the time and effort that Terry and 
others expended in caring for Barbara during the last· months of her life, which the Court regrets 
have been marred by the quarreling of her children and step-children over the disposition of her 
earthly assets. The Court has considered the credibility of the testimony of all parties to this case 
in light of the fact that each of these individuals has something to gain monetarily as 
beneficiaries of Barbara's estate. 
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testimony conveyed a sense that Mark and Tami coerced Barbara's signature through the use of 
subtle threats and hostility. 
28. It is not necessary for the Court to determine what actually happened at this meeting in 
order to decide the issues at trial. Each side has villianized the other, and the Court cannot, and 
need not, determine the credibility of each competing version of events. However, all of this does . 
serve to illustrate the combative, manipulative nature of the circumstances surrounding this 
litigation. 
29. Within hours of securing the resignation of trustee document, Mark presented it to Terry, 
to his attorney, and to the administrator of the Wedbush investment account, Kim Hodges. 
30~ When Mark brought Kim Hodges a copy of the resignation of trustee document and 
asked to change the named trustees on the Wedbush account, Mr.·Hodges did change;the names 
on the account. 
31. Due to the competing documents that Mr. Hodges received on March 19 and March 21, 
Mr. Hodges talked to Wedbush legal counsel and Wedbush decided to freeze the account. 
32. Since that time, the only withdrawals from the Wedbush acc~unt·have been two separate 
withdrawals for the purpose of paying attorney fees. Plaintiffs dispute the validity of the June 
2013 withdrcl:wal and the parties agreed to the January 14 withdrawal, wherein Wedbush 
distributed $49,200 (1/2 to each side) for the intended use.of paying attorney fees 
33. Shortly thereafter, Mark and Andrew created warning notices that they posted in 
numerous places on the premises of the American Fo_rk residence which warned potential 
purchasers not to buy the house. 
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34. Michelle Thomas, one of the Ellsworth siblings, further escalated the mounting conflict 
by sending a series of hostile email communications to Terry. These emails, sent on March 21, 
called Terry "evil" and stated that a Utah County prosecutor was in the process of prosecuting 
Terry for elder abuse. (Exhibit 14.) Through these emails Michelle also told Terry, "I will visit 
yow- work, your house, your childrens [sic] or have you monitored by a private investigator until 
I get there, that is already in the works." Id During the discovery process, however, Michelle 
conceded that the threats of prosecution and private monitoring were baseless. The Court finds 
that Michelle's testimony at trial that the emails do not accurately reflect what she typed is not 
credible and that she was one of many players in these events that served to escalate the conflict 
rather than act to resolve it. 
35. Subsequent to these events, Barbara again met with Mr. Skabelund on March 22, 2013, 
and she expressed to him that she did not want to resign as trustee of the 1991 Trust and that she 
wanted to complete the sale of the American Fork residence. 
36. Barbara dictated a withdrawal of her resignation to Mr. Skebelund, which they both then 
~ signed and which states that Barbara wished to sell the American Fork residence. (Exhibit 19.) It 
is not necessary to rule on the legal efficacy of this docwnent, but the Court notes that it tends to 
demonstrate Barbara's ability to understand what her property is and to formulate a plan for its 
disposal. 
37. However, both Mark and Andrew Ellsworth testified that when they met with Barbara on 
that same day, she seemed feeble, confused, and thought that Andrew was his deceased brother 
Daniel. 
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38. On May 30, 2013 Barbara resigned as trustee and filed a petition t~ remove Mark as co-
trustee of the 1991 Trust. (Exhibit 57.) Among her chief complaints was Mark's failure to pay 
her any of the trust income from the six-plex to which she was entitled during the month of May 
2013. After this point, Mark ceased making payments to Barbara from the six~plex income. The 
Court finds that Mark's failure to properly distribute 1991 Trust income to the 1991 Trust 
beneficiary constitutes a breach of his duties as co-trustee. 
39. The parties stipulate that Mark and Terry were co-trustees of the 1991 Trust no later than 
May 30, 2013. 
40. In June 2013, Terry assisted Barbara in using 1991 Trust funds to pay Mr. Skabelund's 
bill. (Exhibit 20.) 
41. On June 13, 2013, Mark sent Terry an email which reads, "Terry, It is now my 
understanding that you and I are co trustees of the trust. Are you willing to discuss trust issues 
with me?" (Exhibit 39.) At trial, Terry testified that-she did not respond to this email or attempt 
to coordinate trust administration with Mark. 
42. On November 15, 2013, a Warranty Deed conveying an interest in the six-plex and 
residence·from the 1991 Trust to the 2013 Trust was recorded. (Exhibit 34.) 
43~ On December 16, 2013, Terry, in her capacity as agent·and attorney-in-fact for Barbara, 
issued a Demand for Withdrawal wherein she demanded that 50% the American Fork residence, 
the six-plex, the Wedbush account, and 50% of all cash on hand be transferred from the 1991 
Trust to the 2013 Trust. (Exhibit 27.) The Court finds that this constitutes a breach of Terry's 
duties as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. 
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44. On that same day, Terry executed a Bill of Assignment which purports to transfer the 
contents contained in safe deposit boxes at the Bank of Amerian Fork to the 2013 Trust. (Exhibit 
24.) This does not constitute a breach of Terry's duties as co-trustee because the precious metals 
were not property of the 1991 Trust. 
45. Barbara passed away on December 18, 2013. The parties have stipulated that, at the time 
she died, Barbara suffered from advanced dementia and Parkinson's disease. Fact Stip. ,r 4. 
46. At least one time after Barbara's death, Terry attempted to transfer funds from the 
Wedbush account to the 2013 Trust. (Exhibit 62.) 
47. Since Barbara's death, Terry has managed and overseen the American Fork residence. 
She testified that she spent 3-4 hours per month overseeing the property, and seeks $400.00 per 
month as compensation. The Court will grant the request, but because it lacks any factual 
evidence supporting $400.00 as compensation, it will award her $200.00 per month. 
48. On January 14, 2014, Wedbush distributed $49,200 (1/2 to each side) for the intended use 
of paying attorney fees. 
49. Evidence Relevant to determining Barbara Ellsworth's capacity to execute the 2013 
Trust. The evidence clearly established that as early as 2011 Barbara suffered from some level 
of cognitive decline and that shortly before her death, Barbara lived in a state of incoherent 
unresponsiveness. 
50. The parties have stipulated that Dr. Matthew Shellenberg: 
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a. was competent to offer a statement about Barbara Ellsworth based on his personal 
knowledge, his years of medical training expertise and experience, and his experience 
with Barbara; 
b. was Barbara's primary physician as of November 13, 2013; 
c. had been caring for Barbara since May 2, 2013 when Barbara was put in hospice 
care; 
d. determined that as of November 13, 2013 Barbara had advanced dementia 
associated with her Parkinson's disease; 
. e. indicated that, as of November 13, 2013, Barbara was unable to appropriately 
respond to questions and had only the minimal ability to communicate anything; 
f. Stated that as of November 13, 2013, he c~uld not understand Barbara's responses 
to even his most basic questions. It appeared to him that Barbara had almost no ability to 
perceive or understand what was being asked. Barbara had almost zero ability to make 
her perceptions known to others. He could not even get her to answer simple questions 
about whether Barbara was in pain, what complaints she had, etc. 
·g. Stated that, as of November 13, 2013, most of what Barbara said was a "word 
salad," which meant her words were simply jwnbled up with no coherent meaning or 
structure to them. Barbara was also in an extremely weak condition; and 
h. Opined that because Barbara suffered from •Parkinson's disease and severe 
dementia that, on November 13, 2013, her being subjected to questions from lawyers 
would create a great deal of stress and anxiety; no matter how politely the questions were 
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asked, which in turn, would exacerbate her already serious symptoms, such as her 
disorientation, jwnbled speech, anxiety, etc. Even if Barbara could perceive the intent of 
the lawyers' questions, which he believed Barbara would not be able to do, Barbara 
would have likely become very frustrated, confused, and possibly agitated by her 
inability to make her perceptions known, if Barbara had any such perceptions. 
51. On August 17, 2011, a Preadmission Screening Resident Review (PASRR) was 
completed for Barbara. It was completed by Pat Parkinson, LCSW, who is employed by Wasatch 
Mental Health. Ms. Parkinson determined, among other things, that Barbara had some past 
symptoms of mania, depression, and memory loss. Barbara made some errors on a clock-drawing 
test and scored below average on a test requiring her to name letters beginning with the letter F. 
The report also noted that Barbara had a diminished ability to perform many activities of d~ily 
living, including the "handling of money." (Exhibit 45.) Ms. Parkinson also testified at trial that 
Terry provided information about an incident where Barbara became confused while driving a 
vehicle. 
52. Tim McGaughy, MD reviewed and approved this PASRR assessment. Id 
53. At trial, the -Ellsworth siblings, particularly Mark and Marilyn, testified that Barbara 
believed her home was infested with bugs that were really pieces of lint, transferred a significant 
amount of money to local artist Janice Kapp Perry, gave a health care worker access to her bank 
accounts, collected her own stool sample and placed it on her stove to heat and preserve it, was 
forgetful and oft confused about picking up medications from the pharmacy, ,purchased a 
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$3,000.00 vacuum, fell victim to an online credit card scam, and purchased items from TV 
infomercials of which she had no conceivable use. 
54. On October 4, 2012, Barbara and Terry visited Dr. Sean Curzon, D.O., who had 
previously treated Barbara. Dr. Curzon's note from this visit states: "Barbara Ellsworth is a 78 
year old female here for concerns about several items. Her daughter is also worried about several 
items. Has noted more confusion recently more absentmindedness. Inability to remember names 
and how to do certain things.'' (Exhibit 46.) 
55. As a result of the October 4, 2012 visit, Dr. Curzon assessed Barbara as having 
"confusion" (among other things) and also prescribed the drug Namenda. Namenda is a 
medication used to treat dementia. 
56. In November 2012, Barbara was admitted to American Fork Hospital as the result of a 
fall she h~d sustained. Upon admission, Dr. Michael B. Jolley, M.D., interviewed Terry. Terry 
had noticed that Barbara had a bit ·of confusion during the previous three days that was more than 
her baseline cognitive impairment. Terry was planning to take Barbara in to be evaluated, but the 
fall kept her from doing so. (Exhibit 48.) 
57. On November 16, 2012, a second PASRR assessment was completed for Barbara, again 
by Pat Parkinson. This assessment indicated that Barbara suffered from day/night confusion, 
showed symptoms of depression, was unable to manage her money or medications 
independently, and had recently suffered a noticeable general increase in confusion. (Exhibit 47.) 
58. Ms. Parkinson concluded that Barbara's dementia had progressed, that she should no 
longer live alone, and that her condition was not likely to improve. Id. 
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59. The November 19, 2012 medical records note a history and symptoms of dementia, 
bipolar disorder, and Parkinson's disease. (Exhibit 48.) 
60. On November 20, 2012, Dr. Walstri Fonseca ordered "cognitive retaining," noting that 
Barbara had dementia. The notes also indicate that Barbara was pleasant, but confused. Id . 
61. The November 21, 2012 notes indicate that Barbara was alert and pleasant but confused 
and disoriented as to time and place. Id. 
62. The November 25, 2012 notes indicate that Barbara was forgetful. Id 
63. Barbara's medical records contain similar entries throughout the month of December 
2012./d 
64. On January 16, 2013, Barbara met with Dr. Fonseca, who indicated that Barbara still 
suffered from dementia and memory loss, but was otherwise doing well. (Exhibit 50.) 
65. On January 21, 2013, Barbara met with Dr. Curzon as a result of reported delusions. 
66. On February 6, 2013, nursing notes indicate that Barbara was confused intermittently, 
forgetful, incontinent, and dependent on others for activities of daily living. On February 13, 
..d, 2013, the nursing notes indicate that Barbara was forgetful, incontinent, and dependent on others 
for activities of daily living. (Exhibit 51.) 
67. The March 18, 2013 medical notes indicate that Barbara was slightly confused and 
forgetful. It was also noted that the Parkinson's seemed to be worsening. (Exhibit 52.) 
68. On the morning of March 19, 2013-the day the 2013 Trust documents were executed-
Terry accompanied Barbara to the office of Dr. Sean Curzon, D.O., for an examination. Terry 
testified that the purpose of the visit was to follow up on Barbara's hip fracture and to see if 
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Barbara was "able to make self-care directives, and participate in an overall understanding of 
surroundings, and ability to participate in decision making process." (Exhibit 32.) All three of 
Barbara's children were present for the March 19 appointment. 
69. Dr. Curzon's report indicates that Barbara suffered from confusion but that "at this point 
she should be able to still manage her legal affairs but would have family available if needed 
should there be any changes." Id 
70. During that visit, Dr. Curzon completed a Mini Mental Status Exam (MMSE), and 
Barbara scored a 20/30, which typically indicates that a patient is on the borderline between mild 
and moderate cognitive impairment. Dr. Curzon noted that despite this MMSE score, "[Barbara] 
is overall still able to understand conversations and being [sic] an active participant in her care." 
Id. 
71. Dr. Checketts, an expert witness called by the Ellsworth siblings, testified that Barbara's 
progressive mental illness probably affected her ability to understand legal documents and put 
her at greater risk of being influenced by others. 
7~. N~sing notes from March 28, .2013 i~dicate that Barbara was confused intermittently, 
forgetful, lethargic, incontinent, and dependent on others for activities of daily living. (Exhibit 
52.) 
73. On April 12, 2013, attorney Scott Walsh sent an email to Plaintiffs counsel Brett Cragun 
which states that Mr. Skabelund indicated that h~ believed Barbara did not have capacity to act 
as trustee. The email does not discuss Barb~ra's testamentary capacity.as it existed in March 
2013. (Exhibit 104.) 
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74. Ultimately, the Court finds that on March 19, 2013, at the time and place she executed 
the docwnents, Barbara suffered from a long-standing dementia and some confusion. However, 
the court also finds that the level of impairment by dementia waxed and waned, often being 
exacerbated when she was hospitalized for other physical conditions, and that even in light of 
dementia and confusion Barbara knew who her children and step-children were, knew the objects 
of her bounty, and knew how she wanted to dispose of her bounty. Further, the Court finds that 
even where Barbara may have had confusion (such as what a particular date) the evidence clearly 
established that she knew she had a house, that she owned the six-plex, and knew of the 
existence of the investment account. 
Analysis 
One important function of our court system is its role as ultimate decider in situations 
where estate beneficiaries fail to work together in unity for the good of the family as a whole. 
This Court must now step in and play that role for this family that has failed to work together to 
reach a beneficial solution by themselves. 
Barbara did not lack testamentary capacity to execute the 2013 Trust documents on 
March 19, 2013. The law provides a wide variety of standards for competency, each to be 
applied and understood in the context of a particular legal question. Each legal question is 
dependent upon the factual underpinnings that the case presents. In this case, the first question 
the Court must answer is whether Barbara had capacity to execute the 2013 Trust documents on 
March 19, 2013. The Court finds and concludes that she did have testamentary capacity. 
The classic test of general testamentary capacity has three elements: to make a will, one 
~ust be able to (1) identify the natural objects of one's bounty and recognize one's 
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relationship to them, (2) recall the nature and extent of one's property, and (3) dispose of 
one's property understandingly, according to a plan formed in one's mind. 
In re Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985). Whenever an individual's testamentary capacity is at 
issue, "[ c ]ontestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent due to 
capacity." Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-407. This same burden applies when a party challenges the 
testamentary intent required to create or fund a trust. Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-402(l){a); Utah 
Code Ann.§ 75-7-604. To carry this burden of proof, the contestant must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the trustor lacked testamentary capacity. Kesler, 102 P .2d at 
88. At:i in~ividual need not be particularly alert, nor need the person have any special acumen in 
order to execute a will or trust. Estate of loupe v. Carter, 878 P .2d 1168, 1173 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Finally, the contestant must show that the person lacked testamentary capacity at the time 
the will or trust was made, and the inquiry shouid be iimited to a period of time not too remote 
from that event. Kesler, 702 P.2d at 93. 
The Court must be careful not to conflate the indicators an average person might use to 
gauge a person's ability to make important life decisions with the actual legal standard for 
testamentary capacity. Indeed, sometimes people are surprised to learn that case law has 
established that a finding of mental retardation does not preclude a finding of testamentary 
capacity. In re Estate ofTeel, 483 P.2d 603 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). In Teel, the court was faced 
with a factual scenario where a testator functioned on the level of a twelve year old. Mr. Teel 
was mentally retarded. Nevertheless, evidence showed he could drive a car and complete simple 
manual tasks. He could assume the responsibility for running errands, care for flower gardens, 
and complete other assignments. He did not get along with his brother and ultimately 
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disinherited him. The brother challenged the will on the basis of capacity. The brother argued 
that because the decedent had been declared incompetent and had had a guardian placed over 
him he did not possess testamentary capacity. The court found otherwise. Again, the question is 
whether testamentary capacity exists, which by law can exist when a person is placed under 
guardianship and when a person is mentally redarded or demented. See accord, Jackson c. 
Schrader, 676 N.W.2d 599, 606 (Iowa 2003). 
Dementia can also exist at the same time as testamentary capacity. A great number of 
Utah courts have found testamentary capacity even in the face of a finding of dementia or 
indications of dementia. See, e.g., In re Chonga's Estate, 202 P.2d 711 (Utah 1949); In re 
Hansen's Will, 177 P. 98~ (Utah 1918); In re Swan's Estate, 170 P. 452 (Utah 1918). 11 
Upon review of the evidence, the Court concludes that the contesting parties·have 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Barbara suffered from dementia and other 
conditions which may have hampered her mental condition. However, this Court heard very 
11 In their briefs, the Ellsworth siblings rely heavily on In re Astill's_ Estate, 381 P.2d 95 
(Utah 1963). In that case, the decedent was found to lack testamentary capacity based on a 
doctor's testimony that the decedent was a "confused elderly gentleman whose speech was 
incoherent. .. had poor muscle coordination; was not able to care for himself physically or dress 
himself adequately. He could not answer questions in a coherent manner ... was emotionally very 
labile [unstable] and difficult to manage, easily agitated." Id. at 97. The doctor also conciuded 
that the decedent "exhibited an organic confusional state in which he was not aware of the time, 
place and had difficulty in remembering things. He acted impulsively and was irrational." Id 
The Court notes that, while some of the above symptoms may have certainly applied to Barbara 
in March 2013, in contrast to the decedent in Asti/l, the testimony and evidence at trial has not 
demonstrated that Barbara lived in such an organic confusional state in which she was unable to 
answer questions coherently or understand her surroundings. In this way, Barbara presents a very 
different case than the decedent in Astill. 
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little, if any, credible evidence that Barbara did not understand her relationship to her children 
and step-children, the nature of her property, and her ability to form a plan to dispose of that 
property through the 2013 Trust. 
The only evidence that has been offered that Barbara did not recognize the objects of her 
bounty and her relationship to them was the assertion that she mistook Andrew for his deceased 
brother Daniel. However, the Court must consider the fact that both Andrew.and Mark (who 
made this assertion) both have something to gain from a finding that Barbara lacked capacity. 
This, in conjunction with the fact that their assertion lacks corroboration from other independent 
sources, leads the Court to conclude that this assertion does not outweigh other evidence, 
discussed below, which tends to show that Barbara did not lack capacity. Again, as stated, the 
Court finds that Barbara knew who her children and step-children were, knew she had a house, 
that she owned the six-plex, and knew of the existence of the investment account, and knew how 
she wanted to dispose of those particular assets, which are the assets at issue in this case. 
The medical evidence and expert testimony tend to demonstrate that Barbara was 
sometimes confused and often required assistance to complete_ the tasks of daily living. The 
Court has reviewed Barbara's various medical records which often refer to difficulties in her 
ability to care for herself and to make decisions on her own behalf. The records also note that she 
was sometimes confused and forgetful. While these considerations are not irrelevant to a 
determination of testamentary capacity, they tend to provide little guidance in regards to her 
ability to understand what her property is and to whom she wants it to go. Such evidence is 
certainly important to determining whether Barbara possessed the mental capacity to serve as 
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trustee or to manage her own financial affairs. However, those standards are different than the 
one the Court must follow for testamentary capacity. 
The Ellsworth siblings have not met their burden to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Barbara lacked testamentary capacity during the relevant time period. The Court 
does not doubt Dr. Checketts's conclusion that Barbara probably was unable to understand legal 
documents. Many parties who sign legal documents do not understand the intricacies and nuance 
of the language in the documents they sign. However, that is not the standard for testamentary 
capacity or even normal capacity to enter a contract. Accordingly, Dr. Checketts's testimony 
carries little substantive weight. In contrast, the withdrawal of resignation document dated March 
22, 2013 that Barbara prepared with the assistance of Mr. Skabelund tends to demonstrate that 
she was able to understand, for example, that she owned the American Fork residence and that 
she wanted to sell that residence to a particular family. This speaks directly to her ability to know 
what her property is and to formulate a plan for its disposition. Furthermore, Mr. Skabelund, a 
professional who regularly practices in the areas of trusts and estate planning, testified that he did 
not believe that Barbara lacked testamentary capacity at the time.she executed the 2013 Trust. 
Mr. Skabelund's position as her estate planning attorney required him to discuss with Barbara 
her normal estate planning issues: her property, her heirs, and her plan. In this role he is wtlquely 
qualified to understand Barbara's capacity. Barbara also was examined by a medical doctor on 
the day the trust was executed. Although Dr. Curzon noted some level of impairment on the day 
the 2013 Trust was executed and in his deposition testimony, he also expressed his opinion that 
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Barbara was able to generally understand what was going on and make decisions concerning her 
assets. 
Considering the relevant standard for testamentary capacity, the Court concludes that the 
evidence tends to preponderate against a finding that Barbara lacked capacity to execute her 
2013 esta~e planning documents, including the 2013 Trust. 
The 2013 Trust documents were not procured through undue influence. Before a 
court can declare a will invalid for undue influence, 
There must be an exhibition of more than influence or suggestion, there must be 
substantial proof of an overpowering of the testator's volition at the time the will was 
made,: to the extent he is impelled to do that which he would not have done had he been 
free from such controlling influence, so that the will represents the desire of the person 
exercising the influence rather than that of the testator. 
luope, 878 P.2d at 1174, quoting In re Lavelle 's Estate, 248 P.2d 632 (Utah ,1952). It is 
significant to note, however, thatundue influence is presumed where a confidential relationship 
exists between the trusf or will creator and the beneficiary of the will or trust. Id. The existence 
of a confidential relationship is generally a question of fact. In re Estate of Jones, 159 P .2d 345, 
347 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) rev 'don other grounds, 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993). "While kinship 
may be a factor in determining the existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, 
there must be a showing, in addition to the kinship, [ of] a reposal of confidence by 6ne party and · 
the resulting superiority and influence on the other party ... Mere confidence in one person by 
another is notsufficient alone to establish such a relationship." Id. at 347-48, quoting Bradbury 
v. Rasmussen, 401 P~2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). 
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However, even where a confidential relationship exists, the presumption of unfairness 
may be overcome by countervailing evidence if the defending party proves the absence of 
unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell, 614 P.2d 1226 (Utah 
1983) (finding of confidential relationship in execution of trust shifted burden to defendant to 
prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence). 
In the present matter, it is clear that a confidential relationship existed between Barbara 
and Terry. This relationship arises not simply because of their mother-daughter relationship, but 
because of the confidence Barbara reposed in Terry in giving her power as her agent, her 
attorney-in-fact, and in depending on Terry for other aspects of day-to-day living. Terry 
apparently expended time and effort in caring for Barbara during the final years of Barbara's life. 
Such a r~lationship has only become a problem to the extent that Terry has used her position to 
facilitate transfers of funds that significantly benefit her and where Terry may have been in a 
position to exert undue influence over the changes in her mother's estate plan. 
However, as the case law indicates, the Court need not make a finding of undue influence 
,~ even if a confidential relationship exists, as long as there is adequate evidence showing that the 
transaction was not unfair. While the Court recognizes that the Defendants bear the burden to 
prove fairness, it also notes that very little evidence has been shown to prove undue influence. 
The fact that Barbara was close to Terry and her other children does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that undue influence existed. In the present matter, there is simply no showing of 
undue influence, and while a close relationship existed between Barbara and Terry, there has 
been no showing that that relationship overcame Barbara's own wishes as to her plans for 
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distribution of her estate or in any way interfered with her appreciation of the property she 
owned or to whom she might give it upon her death. To the contrary, the trial testimony and 
evidence has dispelled the presumption of undue influence. The Defendants have met their 
burden by showing that that Barbara's trust documents were prepared with the assistance of her 
attorney Mr. Skabelund, that the new estate plan reflected Barbara's own wishes, and that 
Barbara had .her own personal motivations to create the estate plan because she was upset with 
Mark and others of the Ellsworth children. 
Plaintiffs rely in part on a case out of Florida, another UPC state, in support of their 
assertion that Terry exerted undue influence over Barbara. Many important facts of that case, 
Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So-.2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), bear uncanny similarity to the one 
at bar. In Williamson,.the decedent conveyed an interest in her home to her next door neighbor, 
who had aided the decedent in caring for day-to-day physical needs. Id at 696. The neighbor 
testified that she had been the one to take the decedent to the lawyer to change the decedent's 
estate plan, but that she had done so at the request of the decedent. Id The decedent had given 
the neighbor a power of attomey . .Jd Shortly.before her death, the decedent suffered a 
debilitating health condition, and as a result, the neighbor took on the responsibilities of 
caretaker. Id 
The trial· court found a presumption of undue influence due to the confidential 
relationship existing between the decedent and her neighbor. Id at 695. Relying on this 
presumption, the trial court found that the conveyance of assets was procured by undue 
influence. Id. O~.appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court~ finding 
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that although a confidential relationship existed, the neighbor's testimony that she played an 
active role in altering the decedent's estate plan at the decedent's request due to the neighbor's 
ongoing role in caring for the decedent "provided the credible explanation required by [case law] 
to dispel the presumption of undue influence." Id at 696. 
In the present matter, Terry, much like the neighbor in Williamson, had a close personal 
relationship with the decedent and assisted her with many tasks of day-to-day living. Terry, like 
the neighbor in Williamson, played an active role in altering the decedent's estate plan by 
arranging meetings with an attorney and by driving her to the appointment. Also like the 
Williamson neighbor, Terry has a credible explanation to dispel the presumption of undue 
influence: she acted at Barbara's request and already assisted Barbara with daily tasks before the 
events of this litigation took place. 
Even though a confidential relationship existed between Barbara and Terry, the evidence 
preponderates against a finding of unfairness. Therefore, the Court finds that the 2013 estate 
planru.ng ·documents are not the result of undue influence. 
The transfers to the 2013 Trust are valid and enforceable. In their trial brief, the 
Ellsworth siblings allege that "Terry had a conflict of interest in transferring assets to the 2013 
Trust via Barbara's power of attorney and consequently the 2013 Transfer to the 2013 Trust 
should be declared void by the Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504," which states, 
Any loan, sale, or encumbrance on behalf of a principal with his attorney-in-fact, or with 
the attorney-in-fact's spouse, agent, or attorney, or any entity or trust in which the 
attorney-in-fact has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction involving the 
attorney-in-fact ·which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable unless 
the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested persons and others as 
directed by the court. 
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To the Court's knowledge, no transactions in this matter received prior court approval. Plaintiffs 
have alleged that Exhibits 20 (Bank of American fork records showing checks written to Steve 
Skabelund), 21 (Barbara's 2013 estate planning documents prepared by Mr. Skabelund), 34 
(Ellsworth home title documents), 27 (Demand for Withdrawal signed by Terry), and 24 (Bill of 
Assignment transferring Barbara's personal assets to the 2013 Trust) elucidate Terry's conflict of 
interest in acting as attorney-in-fact for Barbara while simultaneously a trust beneficiary. The 
Court does find that a substantial conflict of interest did exist with respect to some of these 
transfers. However, none of the transfers falls within the statute cited above. The Court will 
address each exhibit in turn. 
· Exhibit 20 contains bank records of Barbara's personal account, including deposit slips 
and copies of checks payable to Mr. Skabelund. Terry's triai testimony was that Barbara directed 
the transfers and signed the checks. Terry assisted Barbara in writing the checks but did not 
invoke her power as agent and attorney-in-fact to do so. No evidence has been presented to the 
Court that payment of legal fees constituted an improper use of these funds. The Court finds that 
the evidence shows that Barbara, not Terry, effectuated the transfers shown in Exhibit 20. For 
this reason, the Exhibit 20 transfers are not voidable under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504. 
Exhibit 21 contains the entirety of Barbara's 2013 estate planning documents prepared by 
Mr. Skabelund, which include documents that transfer property to the 2013 Trust. Barbara, not 
Terry, executed these documents, therefore, Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-504 is not implicated with 
respect to these· transfers. 
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Exhibit 34 contains title documents to the American Fork residence. Again, because 
Barbara acted as signatory on these documents and not Terry, Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504 is not 
implicated with respect to these transfers. 
Exhibit 27 includes correspondence from Barbara to the co-trustees of the 1991 Trust 
entitled "Demand for Withdrawal." This document directs the co-trustees to transfer 50% of all 
trust property to the 2013 Trust and is signed by Terry in her capacity as Barbara's agent and 
attorney-in-fact. The Court finds that Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-504 is not implicated in this 
instance because no transfers of property actually occurred because of this document. However, 
this does demonstrate impropriety because Terry sits on both sides of the table with respect to 
this demand, acting both as agent for Barbara, trustee of the 1991 Trust; and contingent 
beneficiary of the 2013 Trust. Terry's trial testimony and the estate planning documents in 
Exhibits 1 and 21 demonstrate that Terry has more to gain as a beneficiary of the 2013.Trust than 
she does as a beneficiary of the 1991 Trust. The Court finds that this constitutes a substantial 
conflict of interest and will order Terry's removal as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. 
~ Exhibit24 is a Bill of Assignment signed by Terry in her capacity as attorney-in-fact for 
Barbara and which directs the transfer of precious metals to the 2013 Trust. The Court has 
already ruled in its April 1, 2014 Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary judgment that these 
metals were not the property of the 1991 Trust. As a result, the Plaintiffs have no legal interest in 
this property which would allow them to exercise any right under Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-504 to 
void these transfers. Moreover, these transfers would have taken place anyway through Barbara's 
pour-over will. 
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Terry also attempted to transfer funds from the Wedbush account to the 2013 Trust after 
Barbara's death. (Exhibit 62.) The Court finds that the statute is not implicated because the 
transfers have not yet taken place. However, the Court does find that Terry had a conflict of 
interest in attempting to effectuate these transfers. 
Therefore, for all the reasons stated in this section, the Court does not find that any 
transfers of assets to the 2013 are voidable under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504. The Court will 
issue orders for quiet title on the six-plex and the American Fork residence contemporaneously 
with this Order. Below, it will also order that 50% of the Wedbush account be transferred to the 
2013 Trust. 
Terry breached fiduciary duties as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. Plaintiffs have 
petitioned the Court to remove Terry Huffstatler as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust, citing each 
subparagraph of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-706(2), which reads: 
· (2) The court may remove a trustee if: 
(a) the trustee has committed a serious breach of trust; 
(b) lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs the administration of the 
trust 
( c) because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer 
the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the trustee best serves the 
interests of the ·beneficiaries; or 
( d) there has been a substantial change of circumstances or removal is requested by all of 
the qualified beneficiaries, the,court'finds that removal of the trustee best serves the 
interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the 
trust, and a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available. 
Trustees have a duty to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest in carrying out the 
provisions of a trust. As discussed in the preceding section, the Court finds that Terry breached 
her duties as trustee of the 1991 Trust when she attempted to use her power as attorney-in-fact 
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for Barbara to transfer funds from the 1991 Trust to the 2013 Trust. This is most particularly 
evident through the December 16, 2013 "Demand for Withdrawal" wherein she acted as 
signatory in her capacity as Barbara Ellsworth's agent and attomey-in-fact. 12 As a co-trustee of 
the 1991 Trust and a contingent beneficiary of the 2013 Trust, Terry sat on both sides of the table 
while facilitating this transaction. This alone constitutes grounds for removal of Terry as trustee 
because she should have either sought prior court approval or recused herself from acting as 
Barbara's agent with respect to transactions that would substantially benefit her. Terry's attempts 
to withdraw funds from the Wedbush account after Barbara's death also constitute grounds for 
her removal. 
However, the Court will also order Terry's removal as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust 
because her refusal to cooperate with Mark has impaired the administration of the trust. Neither 
Mark nor Terry comes before the Court with clean hands, and the Court finds that at multiple 
junctures·since March 2013, either party could have acted to de-escalate the conflict rather than 
exacerbate it. On June 13, 2013, Shortly after Barbara's resignation as trustee of the 1991 Trust, 
~ Mark attempted to communicate with Terry, asking, "Are you willing to discuss trust issues with 
me?.'' (Exhibit 39.) Terry testified at trial that she did not respond to this correspondence or 
attempt to work with Mark to resolve trust issues. 
12 The Court has noted above, for reasons unrelated to Terry's conduct, that this conflict 
of interest has not acted to invalidate any of the transfers between the 1991 Trust and the 2013 
Trust. 
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Mark breached fiduciary duties as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. Mark, however, is 
not without blame himself. Defendants have also petitioned the Court to remove Mark Ellsworth 
as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust, also citing each subparagraph of Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-7-706(2). 
Of paramount concern to the Court is Mark's failure to make any payments of trust 
income generated by the six-plex to Barbara from May 2013 until her death in December 2013. 
The express language found in Section 7 ~ 1 of the 1991 Trust does not allow the trustee any 
discretion over whether to "pay to or apply for the benefit of the Surviving Trustor the entire net 
income of the Family Trust, in quarterly or more frequent installments." The only discretion 
granted the trustee in this section concerns whether extra funds should be paid to Barbara from 
trust principal: "In addition, if the Trustee deems the net income to be insufficient for the 
reasonable support and maintenance of the Surviving Trustor, the Trustee shall pay to or apply 
for his or her benefit as much of the principal of the Family Trust as the Trustee, in the Trustee's 
discretion, deems necessary for such limited purposes/' Section 7 .1 also allows Barbara to apply 
for additional amounts, with some limitations. , 
"The primary intent of a coUrt, in construing the provisions of a trust, is to carry out the 
intent of the trustor or trustors." In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1982). The Court finds 
that Barbara and Elmer, the trustors of the 1991 Trust, intended to create the Marital Trust to 
provide for the support, maintenance, and happiness of the Surviving Trustor, Barbara. 
One of the primary concerns expressed in Barbara's May 30, 2013 Petition for Removal 
of Co-Trustee was Mark's withholding of mandatory payments of trust income. (Exhibit57.) At 
trial Mark testified that he did not make payments to Barbara because he needed the trust income 
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to repair the roof of the six-plex and there were no funds left over to pay to Barbara. The Court 
believes tpat it is no coincidence that the payments stopped around the same time that the present 
dispute came to a head. Furthermore, the unambiguous language of the trust instrument does not 
allow Mark discretion to decide whether to make payments of trust income to Barbara. For this 
reason the Court will order Mark's removal as co-trustee of the 1991 Trust. 
Mark's failure to work with Terry to effectively administer the trust also constitutes 
grounds for his removal. The Court finds an inconsistency in Mark's logic. He has testified that 
since the beginning of the events wtderlying this litigation he believed that Bar\,ara lacked 
capacity to effectuate legal documents, yet, he attempted to circumvent the procedure outlined in 
Section 11.1 of the 1991 Trust for determining trustee capacity by having her sign the resignation 
of trustee document prepared by his attorney. Mark cannot have it both ways; Barbara either had 
capacity 1rt March of 2013 or she did not. Even though the Court believes that Terry overreacted 
to Mark's initial suggestion that Barbara step down as trustee, the Court also finds that Mark and 
Tami's confrontation with Barbara served only to alienate and estrange members of a family 
already precipitously close to self-destruction. 
Accordingly, the Court will order the removal of Mark Ellsworth as co-trustee of the 
1991 Trust. 
Neither party is awarded attorney fees. Both parties seek attorney fees. "In general, 
Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing 
party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Hughes v. Cafferty, 89 P.3d 148, 
152 (Utah 2004). Each party relies on Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004, which states, "In a judicial 
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proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as justice and equity require, 
award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by 
another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy." The Utah Supreme Court 
has construed the phrase "justice and equity" as including the following factors in considering 
whether to award attorney's fees: 
(a) reasonableness of the parties' claims; 
(b) unnecessarily prolonging litigation; 
( c) relative ability to bear the financial burden; 
(d) result obtained by the litigation and prevailing party concepts; and 
(e) whether a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
- reasons in the bringing or conduct of the litigation. 
Shurtleff v. United Effort Plan Trust, 289 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Utah 2012) (quoting Atwood v. 
Atwood, 25 P.3d 936,947 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)). 
In considerjng these factors, the Court notes that both sides of this case bear some degree 
of fault in escalating the conflict and in failing to resolve the issues amicably. At multiple 
junctures during the year 2013 the Court believes that either side could have acted to de-escalate 
the conflict but rather chose to exacerbate the existing familial tensions. The fact that both parties 
bear some fault is evidenced by the fact that both Terry and Mark must be removed as co-
trustees. 
Although the Court has expressed its disappointment that the parties needed to resort to 
this litigation to resolve the dispute, neither side's claims can be correctly characterized as_ 
frivolous or baseless. The Court does note, however, that the actions of certain parties might be 
correctly characterized as having acted vexatiously, especially in regards to the string of vicious 
emails that Michelle sent to Terry. However, Michelle is by no means the only party to have 
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acted wrongly. Such is the wrath of individuals who feel they are being wrongly disinherited. In 
any case, the Court does not believe it necessary to enumerate and entertain additional rancorous 
lists of grievances between these step-siblings, for in the end, the Court simply does not find that 
justice and equity require an award of attorney fees to either side. 
Conclusions of Law 
The Court finds, concludes, and orders as follows: 
1. The Court finds that, on March 19, 2013, Barbara May Ellsworth did not lack 
testamentary capacity to create, sign, and execute her 2013 estate planning documents, including 
the 2013 Barbara May Ellsworth Trust. These documents are enforceable and represent 
Barbara's own wishes and intent for the distribution of her assets. The Court also finds that 
Barbara's 2013 estate planning documents were not procured through any undue influence on the 
part of her children. 
2. The Court declares that the transfers of assets effectuated by Barbara's 2013 estate 
planning documents are enforceable, including all docwnents found in Exhibit 21 which transfer 
viJ Barbara's beneficial interest in the.property of the 1991 Trust, including but not limited to the 
six-plex, the American Fork residence, the Wedbush account and any of Barbara's other personal 
property not owned by the 1991 Trust. 
3. Barbara's signed March 19, 2013 letter to Wedbush Morgan is an effective transfer of 
he~ beneficial interest in the stock account 30361712; therefore, the trustee of the Barbara May 
Ellsworth Trust is entitled to receive $26,665.86. According to Exhibit 66, this sum equals one 
half of the total account balance as of September 2, 2014. This ruling is a final ruling upon which 
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Wedbush_ Morgan is to rely. To the extent that Wedbush Morgan has not honored the March 19, 
2013 request for withdrawal due to uncertainty surrounding the ultimate ownership of the 
account, this ruling removes that uncertainty and establishes the right of the successor trustee of 
the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust to receive 50% of that account. 
4. The March 19, 2013 Warranty Deed signed by Barbara Ellsworth that transferred 50% 
beneficial interest in the six-plex and the American Fork residence to the trustees of the Barbara 
May Ellsworth Trust is an enforceable transfer. Pursuant to the Court's Quiet Title Order,jointly 
issued with this ruling, whatever portion of the American Fork residence did not transfer to the 
2013 Trust on March 19, 2013 due to any deficiencies in the title history of that property are now 
resolved under the after-acquired title doctrine. See F.D.LC. v. Taylor, 261 P.3d 949 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2011); Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-10. 
5. Because 50% of the beneficial interest of the American Fork residence was transferred 
to the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust as of March 19, 2013, all of the management, maintenance, 
and other expenses incurred are to be equally attributed to the two different trusts which each 
own a 50% interest in that property. Because the Ellsworth Family Trust has not incurred any of · 
the $8,069.27 in costs as set forth in Exhibit 35, the Court orders that half of those expenses in 
the amount of $4,035 be paid from the Ellsworth Family Trust. 13 No evidence of any income 
13 Neither the 1991 Trust nor the 2013 Trust speci~cally provide for trustee . 
compensation for management of real property. The Court grants Terry Huffstatler's request to 
be compensated for managing the American Fork property at the rate of $200.00 per month, 
rather than $400.00 per month. 
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produced by the American Fork residence has been presented to the Court; however, the Court 
orders that the income, if any, produced by this property be shared between the two trust entities. 
6. Likewise, the Court orders that half of all of the six-plex property expenses and 
income that have accrued since March 19, 2013 be shared between the 1991 Trust and the 2013 
Trust. Based upon Exhibit 4b, the six-plex has generated $48,487.00 between March 19, 2013 
and July 31, 2014.14 Therefore, the Court orders the 1991 Trust to.pay half this amount less 
$200.00 per month of the $400.00 monthly management fee paid to Mark Ellsworth, for a total 
of $19,843.00. The trustee of the 1991 Trust may credit to this amount 50% of the property 
maintenance expenses it has incurred since March 19, 2013, including the roof and stair repair 
expenses. 
7. In conjunction with the prior order, the Court orders Mark Ellsworth to provide an 
accounting of the expenses incurred in the management and maintenance of the six-plex since 
March 19, 2013, including the roofand stair repair expenses.-Mark shall provide an accounting 
within 20 days of this Order. The trustee of the 2013 Trust has the right to file an objection with 
(.fV the Court if she believes Mark has incurred unreasonable expenses since March 19, 2013 and the 
parties are unable to agree upon a fair amount amongst themselves. If an objection is made in 
r~gards to a particular expense, the Court will determine whether that expense was reasonably 
incurred in the ordinary course of business. Unless any objections to specific expenses are raised, 
payment is due within 10 days of the date that Mark provides an accounting to the trustee of the 
2013 Trust. 
14 To establish this amount, the Court did not include the first $2,500.00 deposited as it 
was earned prior to March 19, 2013. 
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8. Pursuant to the Assignment of Beneficial Interest Under Trust Deed signed by Barbara 
Ellsworth on March 19, 2013, the successor trustee of the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust owns 
50% of the beneficial interest in the trust Deed that secured the payment of a note dated May 9, 
2002. 
9. The Court previously established through a partial summary judgment order that the 
precious metals at issue in this case were not transferred to the 1991 Trust. The Court also ruled 
that Barbara possessed the precious metals when Elmer died and that they were her personal 
property and not trust property. Because Barbara possessed the testamentary capacity to execute 
her 2013 estate planning documents, those documents control the disposition of Barbara's 
personal property; Plaintiffs' claim to any portion of the precious metals is extinguished. 
10. For attempting to facilitate transfers wherein she had a significant conflict of interest 
and for failing to cooperate with co~trustees to effectively administer the 1991 Trust, the CQurt 
now orders that Terry Huffstatler be removed as co-trustee of the Family Trust. 
11. For ,breaching the trust agreement and for failing to cooperate with co-trustees to 
effectively administer the 1991 Trust, the Court now orders that Mark Ellsworth be removed as 
co-trustee of the Family Trust. 
12. Both parties have requested that, in the event the Court-removes.both Mark and Terry 
as co-trustees of the 1991 Trust, an independent trustee be appointed by the Court. Neither party 
has yet suggested an individual to fill this appointment. The Court now orders both parties to 
meet and confer to decide upon an independent professional or non-professional trustee to 
administer the 1991 Trust. After the parties have decided, the Court orders th~.parties to submit a 
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proposed stipulated order which includes the name of the agreed-upon party for the Court to 
appoint as trustee. 
13. Neither side to these proceedings comes before the Court without some degree of 
fault. Nevertheless, neither side's claims may be characterized as wholly frivolous. For these 
vi; reasons, the Court hereby denies all claims for attorney fees and orders that each party be 
responsible for its own attorney fees incurred throughout this litigation. 
14. Through these orders, the Court has addressed and resolved all claims and 
counterclaims asserted in this case, except for Plaintiffs' claims for conversion and tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations. These two claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
15. The Court directs Defendants' counsel to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Signed this 3rd day of December, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 130400498 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
Date: 
BRETT D CRAGUN Brett@BrettCragun.com 
AARON R HARRIS aharris@djplaw.com 
DOUGLAS B THAYER dthayer@djplaw.com 
SCOTT V WALSH swalsh@skousenpenney.com 
12/04/2014 /s/ KIM OSTLER 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUMC 
. l 
LAST WILL AND TESTAME.l'IT OF 
ELMER A. ELLSWORTH 
I, ELMER A. ELLSWORTH, a rasident of Utah Cou...~ty, Utah, make, 
publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament and 
hereby revoke all of my prior Wills and Codicils. 
FIRST: Marital Status and Family. 
I am married to BARBAEL~ M..11.Y ELLSWORTH. I have seven ( 7) 
children from a previ.ous marriage: KENNETH L. ELLS-WORTH 1 DANIEL L. 
ELLSWORTH.,. Tk~I L. ELLSWORTH JASPER~ r-'.iA...~K L. ELLSWORTH., TIMOTHY L. 
ELLSWORTH., ANDREW L. ELLSWORTH and MICHELLE L. ELLSWORTH. My wif-e, 
BARBARA MAY ELLSWORTH has thr-ee (3) children f.rom a previous 
marriage: TERRY ANN BAKER HUFFSTATLER, KARL VERNON BAKER .:and .KEITH 
AL&1'1· BAKER. Al.l ref-erences in this Will to ·my ''c1'..ildre~" a.re to 
t..riem.. I do not int:end · to provide in this Will for anyone, except 
as may be specifically set forth in this Will and that c.ertain 
Trust described beiow. 
SECOND: Apoointment of Personal Representati.ve and.;Waiver of 
Bond. 
I nominate t.~e following to act, in the priority and\ sequence 
nam9d, as Person.al Representative of this Wi.11 and of rny,estate: 
1 - My spouse, BARBARA MAY ELLSWORTH; a-"ld then 
2. MARK L. ELLSWORTH; and then 
3.. Whomsoever my surviving, competent chiidren shall. 
unanimously appoint in writing. 
1 
® 
If my Personal Representative is unable, unwilling, or ceases to 
act, the next named nominee shall act instead-
My Personal Representative shall receive no compensation for 
services rendered hereunder consistent w:i th compensation being paid 
for services rendered up.der similar circumstances by other similar 
Personal Repres.entatives; he or she shall. not be liabl.e for any 
loss to my estate or to any benefi.ciary resulting from g~od faith 
decisions in executing the powers .hereL~ granted. 
No bond or other secur.i i::y shal2 be required in any 
j uris.di.ction by Inj:"_ Personal Representative. But, if a bond 1s 
required by law, I direct that no surety be r.equired on such bond 
and such bond be .L."1. the lowest amount possibl.e. 
THIRD: Debts, Taxes and Ex-pense:s .. 
My Personal. Representative (a:fi;er conferring with t~ Trustee 
named here-after) shall have ·the authori ~T to pay~ settle or 
compromise in its absolute di-screti·on, all just debts cl..Tld claims 
against my estate, including but not limited tor my unsecured 
d~bts, admin~strati.on, last i..llness., and ftL.'"l.eral expenses;, and all 
taxes payabl.e by reason of my death at such time or times .as i :t may 
determine shall be to the advantage of my estate and my family. 
2 
FOURTH: Personal Prooertv. 
If my spouse sur,tives me, I give to her all i~ems of Personal 
Property (as hereinafter def;ned). If my spouse does not survive 
me, I give those items of Personal Property (but not money, notes, 
documents of tit1e, stock certi=icates or business property) to the 
individuals named in ·my Memorandum of Disposition of .Personal 
Property. This memorandum shall be signed by me, shall descr.:i.be 
each item and shal.l indicate the recipien-r: thereof. If the named 
reci-pi.ent of a particular item does not survive me, then that item 
shall pass as provided in Paragraph FIFTH; and if, a£ter a 
reasonable search among my p_ersona.l effects, such a list cannot be 
found, my Personal Representative shall disregard the ~receding 
language- of this Paragraph. 
FIFTH: Dispo-sition of Residuary Estate. 
11 2'-ly res.iduary estate'' means all my interest in .real and 
personal property, whether comm.uni ;__y or separate and wherever 
situated, which I may own at my death ( excluding property over 
whi.ch I ·may have a power of appo:intment} and. whi.ch I have not 
disposed of ·by the preceding provisions of this Will. 
I give my residuary estate to the Trustee then acting •u."lder 
that ce·rtain 
cre.ated on the 
Trust Agreement named The ELLSWORTH F.e-J1!LY TRUST 
t d-(----day of May, 1991, to be aggregated ~th (and 
held, administered, and distributed as an integral part,of) said 
3 
C, 
~ 
Trust Estate in the manne= and s~bject to the te:::ms and provisions 
provided for i~ the Trust Agreement, including any and all 
amendments thereto made during my lifetime. It is my intention 
that my residuary estate be "poured-over" to The ELLSWORTH FAMILY 
TRUST and shall not be received by the Trustee as a testamentary 
trust or upon any testamentary trust, but solely in the Trustee's 
capacity as Trustee under that Trust Agreement as a distinct legal 
entity a1ready in eJ-::istence at the time of execution of this Will. 
If, - ·for any reason, the pour-ever provided above is 
inoperative or i.s invalid, or if the trust referred to above has 
failed or has been revoked, then I give my residuary esta~e to the 
Trµ.stee named in the pres&""lt provisions 0£ that Tru·st Agreement to 
act after my death, to be hel..d as a testamentary trust in: the same 
manner and upon i.dentical terms and provisions contained in that 
Trust Agreement, wr-...ich, for such purpose, I incorpprate by 
reference her-ei:n. I.n the evsnt that it is necessary to incorporate 
that Trust Agre-eroent by reference in this W.i.1..l. becausie of i.ts 
nonexistence at the. time of di.str.ibution of my estate, then .i:t .is 
my int-ention that the Trust Agreement be ~ncorporat:ed by ~ef·erence 
as of the date of the execution of this Will ('or cf :the last 
Codicil to ~11.is Will) and that no stibseque:it revocation or 
amendment of the trust shall. be incorporated by ref-erence in this 
Will. 
4 
SIXTH: Powers of Personal Representative. 
With respect t:> the admi.nist:::ation and management of my 
estate, my Personal Rep~esentative shall have power and d~scretion 
as compJ.ete as I tad over my property while li.vi.ng. P..nd, in 
addition to all powers and discretions conferred hereunder and by 
1.aw, my Personal. Representative sha.11 have the authority and power 
to take advantage of all tax savings which the law of any 
jurisdi.ction allows, without regard to conflicting interests 0£ 
those interested in my estate a.T'l.d without ma'<ing any adjustments 
among said persons. And to that end to take any one or more of the 
£allowing actions as ·may appear advisable: 
A. To joi..T'l with my .spouse in .execu•ting joint income 
tax returns; 
B. To value my gross estate for ·Federal estate tax 
purposes as· of the date of my death or as of '.the 
alt~rnative valuation date as aliowed for such purposes; 
C. To claim as estate or death tax deductions, or 
both., expenses w.hj_ch would otherwise qualify as income 
tax deductions; 
D.. To e'l.ect to have gifts by my spouse treated; as 
made one-ha.lf by me £or Federa.l gift tax purposes; 
To choose the methods to pay estate or death 
taxes; 
F. To disclaim al 1 or any portion 0£ any interest in 
prop=-rty passing to my estate at or after my death; and 
G. To make &.--iy other elections al lowed by the 
Internal Revenue Code or the tax law of any state. 
5 
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SEVENTH: Su.-..~i vorship. 
If any benef:..ci2.ry hereunder should. die wi t:-,.in six months 
after my death, he or she shall be deemed to have predeceased me 
for ail purposes under this Wiil. 
I, ELMER A. ELLSWORTH, the Testator, sign my name to this 
i.nstrument this ___ _ day of May, 199l, fu.Ld being first duly sworn, 
do hereby decJ..are to t."'l.e undersigned authority· that I sign and 
execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I 1 sign it 
will.ingl.yr that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the 
purposes expressed in it, and that I am 18 years of age or older, 
of sound mind., and under no constraint or undue influence. 
We, STEVEN R. SKJl...BELUND and JENNIFER HEYWOOD, th.e witnesses 
si.gn our names to this instrument, be.i.ng £irst duly swor~, and d;, 
fiereby deciare to the undersigned authority that the Testa~or signs 
and executes this instrument as his Last Will. and that he: .signs it 
wiJ.1.ingl.y., and that each of usr i.n the presence and hearip.g of the 
Testator and each other, hereby signs this Wil.l as witness to the 
Testator's signing r and that to the best of our knowledge the 
· Testator is 18 years of age or older, of sound mind-.,. and= .u..'1.der no 
constraint or u~due influence. 
ADDRESS: 
,.-7 / . . Residing at: 387 W. CEMTER 
ORE.~, UT 84057 
J , 
/ 
.,.··•-7 
_i .•~., ,' •?.-' 14 : 
·-.,. L . . . .,,. - t.,.,C::_,- ;.. __ .• 
/ / 
:"- / ,., 
. , , ,.. .I. ·---~✓ //-: ::.//- ,...,-'1.> 
"- 1.. I• ~ - - Residing at: 835 NO. 75-0 w. 
/ 
PROVO, UT 84601 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
: ss. 
Subscribed, sworn to, and ack..,owledged before me by ELMER A. 
ELLSWORTH, the Testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by 
STEVEN R. SKABELUN""D and JENNIFER HEYWOOD, witnesses, this_/ __ day 
of May .. 1991. 
NOT&7Y PUB:JC 
'-; 
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G:1 
MEHORAKDUM OF DISPOSITION 
OF 
?ERSONAL PROPERTY 
OF 
ELMER A. ELLSWORTH 
Paragraph FOli"P.TH 0£ my Will, executed on the ___ day of May, 
1991, distributes items of my tangible personal property (not 
money, evidences of indebtedi.."l.ess ~ documents of title, stock 
certi fi.cates or business property) in accordance wi. th this writing; 
I hereby make this memorandum for that purpose a...~d to comply with 
the provisions of Utah Code ~..r..n. 75-2-513 (1953, as amended). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Descriotion of Item 
DATED t:tlis day of 
Recinient 
___________ , 19 __ 
ELMER A .. ELLSWORTH 
(Fili this form out in ink; do not cross out or erase. Vse a new 
form and destroy the prior form to make changes.) 
@ 
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ADDENDUMD 
lfittmm 
To 
Subject 
"11/iarl~ Ellsworth" <cmminc21@hotmai!.com> 
terry@utwl re.net 
Far,Hly Request Regarding ::llsworth family Trust 
Date: Wed 3/13/201312:04 PM 
View: HTML j Text I Header I Raw Conten! 
1ktEttezr \Ut!• lliastt Il'Iett.n ]: «:mmlWo:2~ ttllne :ii..Inm:a»llJill:iBti<Dil!l .iarcmn crorur m:eett..:ii.nn%' 1bID mw s.filh>~- ]! 
am writing this to surrnnarize the consensus on how our family feels regarding the 
estate/trust. I would like to sta~t by asking that you try to view this summary 
as if you were in our circumstances (Barbara had passed away 10 years ago, and I 
iilllin .:ii.Im :wanmr ~ti..amn wrli..t!:lin I!!kmati .ii.nnsltteaafi cmif ~ wrii.tt:lln hn:ib@Jl!Jm}) •• 
. \Wie as at famii.Jl._w a11ll Jin:elLii.ewce ~ :ffimlr lB!audm" s uneerll$ :is 1tfue tt1llJP) pir.iimm::ii tb.J'- IDm 
reviewing Barbs health condition, we feel that given her ongoing declining 
medical condition and memory as well as her chronic c.onditions of bipolar, DVT's 
and the recent diagnosis of Parkinson's and others, that she is not in a 
«:XtimI}li:tt:i.«mll 1t.m> ~ amn:w ~ rnmtt.tten:s.. VJJe lb:elliiewe tt1lni.s :ii..s ~ .imi aa::tt:.ii.mxm 
li»_w pmm0 lbl_W 1tli!e bdt 1!:11natt pm l!racdl JH\.iBtdbe:n::a slip «»Welt" ttm> }ittOOII iil }!DD7,War «D1f ati:.tt:cm~ 
iiBilllail am:e llnarnoo:11] ii IJDq]J 11iieJt- :foi.sa:a1l am1farii.lrs _ 
In considering this we believe that the be-st way to proceed is to have Barbara 
officially resign from the trust ( s.he has already defal.ll ted by signing power of 
attorney over to you). This will place the fiscal aspects of the estate/trust 
:ii.mJttap tt:1me IlI61lIIllIIlle .:ii1t \WilL'!, pJl.ainmmelli :fEmnr ~Y Ttd!neun 1t1ine. smm:ri\W!Jl!' <mlf «wmr ~
was Dm> TI~ alhill.e11 amooil. JPllll1t ltl125iQlm•msiitiD:ii]iiq li~Jf :fum.tt:m> a jjami.mtt: ~lln:ii.JP> 
~ pinn amml me .. 
J.1..fter completing Barbs resignation you and I can get together and work out a 
joint- relationship in managing the remaining assets of the estate/trust and 
Barbs ongoing care needs. If you do not have any objections to this direct;i..on,. I 
wmmJl..afl ~ w.e htt:Hn mee11.: ,wi:ttlln ~ 1tcm cdlfi snrnss ttlin:iis amooli .lloiinwe lme1r s:ii.p a 
:iz:esji_c;maittfumm. .. 
If you have reservations or di.sagreements, I would appreciate hearing them, so 
we can try to find an a.greeable solution and continue our relationship in the 
a·f fable fashion that cur.rently exists. 
mall.afconnect.com'Main/frmReaclMessage..aspx?folder-:lnbo,c&m,>..ssageid=37098&mapped=False&user=teTT)-'8.f;omSearch=Fslse&rov.Nwmer-=9&popup=true 1/1 
.~ ' 
FILED 
APR 1 2014 _s() 
~TH DISTR.1c' 
J\TE OF UTAJ; 
UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW L. ELLSWORTH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
TERRY HUFFSTATLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
TERRY HUFFSTATLER (as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Barbara 
Ellsworth, et al. 
Petitioner, 
V. 
MARK L. ELLSWORTH, et al., 
Respondents. 
TERRY HUFFSTATLER, as Trustee of the 
v, Barbara May Ellsworth Trust, 
Intervenor Plaintiff, 
V. 
MARK_L. ELLSWORTH, Co-Trustee of The 
Ellsworth Family Trust, 
Intervenor Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
April 1, 2014 
Case No. 130400498 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
001087 
This matter comes before the court on Defendants Terry Huffstatler, Jim Huffstatler, Karl 
Baker, and Keith Baker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Ownership of 
Precious Metals. The motion is granted. 
Litigation often requires legal conclusion which are contingent upon other 
determinations. With the present motion defendants ask the court to answer the discrete 
question of whether certain precious metals are, or ever were, transferred into the Ellsworth 
Family Trust through the attached schedules or through Elmer Ellsworth's will. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Statement of Relevant and Undisputed Facts 
Events of 1991. On May 1, 1991, Elmer and Barbara Ellsworth ("Elmer" and "Barbara" 
respeciiveiy) executed a Trust Agreement tltat created the Ellsworth Famiiy Trust ("EFT"). EFr 
was notarized contemporaneously with this execution. EFf contains the following provision: 
The Trustors have transferred to the Trustees the property described in 
Schedules A, B, and C with [sic] are or will be attached hereto. The properties 
transferred, unless otherwise designated, shall be beneficially owned by the 
Trustors - 50% as to each Trustor for his or her separate benefit -and shall be 
listed on Schedule'½.." Properties for which Elmer A. Ellsworth is [sic] sole 
beneficial owner shall be listed in Schedule "B" and properties for which 
Barbara May Ellsworth is the sole beneficial owner shall be listed in Schedule 
"C." ... All property initially or hereafter transferred to the trust, including 
property passing to the trust by either of the Trustors' Wills, hereinafter is 
termed the "Trust Estate." 
Neither Trustor ever filled out Schedule A. Elmer did not fill out a Schedule B. 
There is no written document that memorializes the transfer of any other property into 
2 
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EFf. No schedule exists in which Elmer ever listed or identified any precious metals as 
his personal property. 1 Despite not listing the transferred property on Schedule A, on 
May 1, 1991, Elmer and Barbara executed a Warranty Deed that transferred two parcels 
'vJJ) of property - the marital home and a 6-plex - to EFT. After Ehner' s death, an investment 
account at Wedbush Securities, Inc. was created to be held by Barbara, as the Trustee of 
EFT. 
EFI' also includes the following provision: 
7 .1 Family Trust: Lifetime Distributions. (a) During the lifetime of the surviving 
Trustor, the Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the Surviving Trustor 
the entire net income of the Family Trust, in quarterly or more frequent 
installments. In addition, if the Trustee deems the net income to be insufficient 
for the reasonable support and maintenance of the SurvivingTrustor, the Trustee 
shall pay to or apply for his or her benefit as much of the principal of the Family 
Trust as the Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion, deems necessary for such limited 
purposes. 
(b) In any calendar year the Trustee shall also pay over to the Surviving Trustor 
v1' 1Plaintiffs attempt to dispute whether Schedule B was ever filled out. Plaintiffs allege 
that Ken Ellsworth ("Ken") claims he has reviewed a trust document listing the precious metals 
on Elmer's schedule of the trust documents. The court concludes there is no genuine dispute 
concerning Sc1:l;edule B because the alleged facts asserted by plaintiff is inadmissible. Therefore, 
summary judgement is not precluded as a result of these facts. ''While rule 7 provides that '[a] 
party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in.the 
memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials,' it does not change rule 56's requirement 
that a summary judgment motion be supported by admissible evidence, [ citation omitted]. Rule 
56(c); see also Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB & G Eng'g, Inc., 2013 UT App 146, 'II 17,305 P.3d 
171 (' [l]nadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment."' Winegar v. Springville City, 2014 UT App 9,<J[ 19,319 P.3d 1. See infra discussion 
on admi~sibility of Ken's statement. 
3 
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from the principal of this Family Trust such amounts as the Surviving Trustor 
shall request in writing [ subject to specific limitations set forth within this 
section]. 
On May 1, 1991, Elmer also executed a Last Will and Testament ("Will"). 
The Will was notarized contemporaneously with this execution. Within the Will, 
Elmer stated: "[i]f my spouse survives me, I give to her all items of Personal 
Property (as hereinafter defined)." The term "Personal Property" is not defined 
within the Will. There is no Memorandum of Disposition signed by Elmer that 
references any precious metals. 
Barbara also executed a Will ("Barbara's Will") on May 1, 1991 which conveys 
her personal property to the 1991 Trust upon her death. 2 
Events of 2012 - 2013. On December 15, 2012, Terry Huffstatler prepared an 
inventory of the precious metals stored in the safe. Barbara Ellsworth also stored 
precious meta1s in a safety deposit box at the Banlc of American Fork; the precious 
metals stored in this safety deposit box were not included in the December 15, 2012 
fuventory. 
Soon after completing th~ inventory on December 15, 2012, Terry Huffstatler 
and her husband-Jim Huffstatler-rented two safety deposit boxes at a Bank of 
· · 
2 Defendant did not controvert this statement of additional fact at all. This statement is 
not material because no party has provided a statement of fact that Barbara has died. 
4 
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vi, 
American Fork branch, located in Pleasant Grove, to store all of the inventoried precious 
metals. Upon renting the boxes, Terry Huffstatler and Mark Ellsworth removed the 
inventoried precious metals ( other than specific junk silver) from the safe located in 
Barbara'~ home and transported them to the bank and placed the metals in the safety 
deposit boxes. Terry Huffstatler did this "so that we could try to cooperate with each 
other'' and "not create any feud." Throughout Ehner' sand Barbara's marriage, they 
also stored old silver coins that the parties called "junk silver" in the safe located in the 
marital home. 
In January 2013, Mark Ellsworth, Andrew Ellsworth, Terry Huffstatler, Keith 
Baker, and Karl Baker all met at Barbara Ellsworth's residence (her marital home 
before Ehner Ellsworth died) and they counted all of this junk silver and divided it in 
equal portions, one portion of which was to be given to each of the children of Elmer 
or Barbara. 
On December 16, 2013, Terry Huffstatler, as agent and attorney-in-fact for 
Barbara , signed a "Bill of Assignment" which transferred all of Barbara's rights, title 
and interest in all personal property owned by Barbara (including assets in the safe 
deposit boxes) to the Barbara May Ellsworth Trust, dated March 19, 2013 ("2013 
Trust"). 
Despite believing that all of the precious metal and coins were Barbara's 
5 
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personal property, Terry Huffstatler identified herself as the "signer" for access to the 
safety deposit boxes and designated Mark Ellsworth as the individual that "could hold 
the keys."3 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Standard of Law on Motion for Summary Judgment. The court may 
grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material facts" (Utah R. Civ. P. 56 ©) and when "the. moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Id. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the 
Utah Supreme Court has conclu~ed that "the facts and all reasonable inferences 
[should be] drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the n<;mmoving party." 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 'JI 8, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 199~)). The alleged facts do not indicate that the 
precious metals are, or ever were, transferred into the Ellsworth Family Trust 
through the attached schedules or through Elmer Ellsworth's will. Therefore, partial 
summary judgment is grante,d. 
Nature of Ken Ellsworth'_s·Statement. Under Utah law, "[a]n original 
writing ... is required in order to prove its content, except as otherwise provid~9 in 
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by statute. 
3This alleged fact is not consider disputed since the manner by which Terry Huffstatler 
treated the precious metals is not the determining factor of whether they were a part of the 
EFr. 
6 
001082. 
Utah R. Evid. 1002. 
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing, 
recording, or photograph is admissible if: (a) all the originals are lost or 
destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith; (b) an original 
cannot be obtained by any available judicial process; (c) the party against 
whom the original would be offered had control of the original; was at that 
time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the original would be a 
subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or 
hearing; or (d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related 
to a controlling issue. 
Utah ·R. Evid. 1004. 
Ordinarily, the court determines whether the proponent has fulfilled the 
factual conditions for admitting other evidence of the content of a 
writing, recording, or photograph under Rule 1004 or 1005. But in a 
jury tria~, the jury determines--in accordance with Rule 104(b)--any 
issue about whether: (a) an asserted writing, recording, or photograph 
ever existed . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 1008. 
The purpose [the Best Evidence Rule] is primarily to prevent mistake 
or fraud . . . . Therefore, when the content of a document is material to 
the matter to be proved, the original writing must be produced unless it 
is unavailable due to an exception and its absence is not attributable to 
the fault of the party seeking to use it as proof of the contents therein .. 
. . This is due to the extensive risk that the proponent might offer false 
or misleading secondary evidence. 
Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 'iI 37, 17 P.3d 1110. 
The existence of the trust document which Ken stated that he reviewed will 
not be addressed by the court. Instead, the existence of the document that Ken said 
he reviewed will be assumed since the question of its existence would be an issue 
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for the jury. Utah R. Evid. 1004(a). However, the court has determined that the 
statement "Ken has reviewed a trust document listing the precious metals in Elmer's 
schedule of the trust documents" is inadmissable to prove the contents of the 
document. An original writing is required in order to prove its content. 
Rule 1004 provides several exceptions to the requirement that an original be 
provided. The exceptions to the rule do not apply in this case. As stated above, 
"[a]n original writing ... is required in order to prove its content, except as 
otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of 
this State or by statute.· Utah's Rule 1004 which contains some of the pertinent 
exceptions alluded to in Rule 1002 was taken verbatim from the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 1004. Federal court's have addressed the application of the pertinent 
exceptions in this case. Since "the federal versions of the rules cited in this opinion 
remain substantially the s·ame as the Utah versions, we consider decisions 
interpreting the federal rules informative. See State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, CJ[ 
22 n. 1, 32 P.3d 976_ ('Since the advisory committee generally sought to achieve 
uniformity between Utah's rules of evidence and the federal rules of evidence, this 
court looks to the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal courts to aid in 
interpreting the Utah rules. '(brackets and internal ·quotation marks omitted))." State 
v. High, 2012 UT App 180, 'f( 15 n. 10,282 P.3d' 1046. 
Generally, "extrinsic evidence of the content of a document is admissible 
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only when the original document" is lost or destroyed, unobtainable, in the 
possession of an opponent, "or not closely related to the matters at issue in the 
case." Amin v. Loyola Univ. Chicago, 423 F. Supp. 2d 914,917 (W.D. Wis. 2006). 
If a party has not indicated that a missing "document falls into any of these 
categories ... the content of the [ document] is inadmissible and will not be 
considered." / d. 
The "lost or destroyed" and "unobtainable" exceptions listed above will be 
reviewed for cautionary purposes even though the plaintiffs do not explicitly claim 
that the missing document in this case met its fate by those means, but they are 
possibilities that should be ruled out. Exceptions© and (d) are adequately 
determinable from the alleged facts. The proponent does not claim that the missing 
trust document is in the possession of an opponent. And Ken's statement that there 
is a schedule that lists the precious metals as a part of the trust is not only closely 
related, but is directly related to the matters at issue in the case. "Where the missing 
original writings in dispute are the very foundation of the claim, which is the 
situation in this case, more strictness in proof is required than where the writings are 
only involved collaterally." Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Flanagan, 352 F.2d 
1005, 1008 (1st Cir. 1965). Therefore, there is no need for the court to further 
analyze t~e possible applicability of exception© and (d), as listed above. 
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Rule 1004( a): All the Originals Lost or Destroyed, Not By the Proponent 
Acting in Bad Faith. When the original is lost or has been destroy, but not by the 
proponent in bad faith, oral testimony abut the "contents of a lost writing may be 
proved by" ... "' any kind of secondary evidence ranging from photographs and 
handwritten copies to oral testimony of a witness.'" United States v. Walker, 60 F. 
App'x 631,638 (8th Cir. 2003) quoting United States v. Gerhart, 538 F.2d 807, 809 
& n. 2 (8th Cir.1976). The "secondary evidence of a document may consist of ... 
oral evidence of the contents by one who has seen it and knows its contents." Wiley 
v. United States, 257 F.2d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 1958) quoting Hartzell v. United 
States, 8 Cir., 72 F.2d 569, 578. A court can "prudently rel[y] upon the generally 
accepted rule that if the party relying upon the writing can prove that a writing 
existed and has been lost or destroyed, he is relieved of the burden of producing the 
original and can present secondary evidence of its contents." KJein v. Frank, 534 
F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1976). 
When production of evidence is not feasible due to loss or destruction, the 
proper procedure for a party to establish this is through testimony of witnesses. 
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 1963). "Evidence of the content of 
the original is not admissible unless the proponent of the testimony shows that a 
reasonable and diligent search has been made for the odginal without success .... 
There is no universal or fixed rule that determines the sufficiency of the proof 
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required to show that a reasonable or diligent search has been made. Each case is 
governed in large measure by its own particular facts and circumstances." Sylvania 
Elec. Products, Inc. v. Flanagan, 352 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1st Cir. 1965). "Where an 
actual document is unavailable, secondary evidence of the contents of the document 
is admissible so long as the original [document] was not destroyed or lost in bad 
faith. Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 81 F. Supp. 2d 227, 230 (D. 
Mass. 2000) aff d, 248 F.3d l (.1st Cir. 2001), quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. 
Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1132 (5th Cir.1992). Secondary evidence is 
admissible when the primary evidence is unintentionally destroyed. London v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California, Inc., 417 F.2d 820,825 (9th Cir. 1969). 
When Ken's statement is analyzed under the sub-requirements of exception 
(a) (originals lost or destroyed not by the proponent acting in bad faith) under rule 
1004, the statement is not admissible. Though there is secondary evidence in the 
form of testimony being offered by one who has possibly seen the document, the 
testimony here is non-specific concerning the content of the original document. 
More importantly, the alleged facts do not indicate, or even allege, that the original 
document has been lost or destroyed, accidentally or in good faith, which would 
relieved the proponent of the burden of producing the original. Nor has the 
proponent shown through a witness that the document has been lost or destroyed and 
that if it has been lost or destroyed that the proponent of the testimony shows that an 
11 
001077 
unfruitful reasonable and diligent search for the original has been made. The 
proponent does not satisfy the requirement that case law established, under rule 
1004( 1 ), for Ken's statement to be considered secondary evidence of the original 
that have been lost or destroyed. Therefore, the statement is inadmissible under Rule 
1004(a). 
Rule 1004(b) An Original Cannot be Obtained by Any Available Judicial 
Process. "Rule 1004(2) provides that an original writing is not required if it cannot 
be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure." U.S. ex rel. El-Amin v. 
George Washington Univ., 522 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (D.D.C. 2007). In U.S. v. 
Philips, the Tenth Circuit Court reasoned that a district court c~rrect~y found that 
"the original "could not be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure,' 
making the copy admissible," because the proponent in that case "adequately 
established the document's authenticity" when a witness identified and testified to 
the document's unaltered condition. United States v. Phillips, 543 F.3d 1197, 1204 
(10th Cir. 2008). "When the original is in the possession of a third person, inability 
to procure it from him by resort to process or other judicial procedure is sufficient 
explanation of nonproduction."); U.S. ex rel. El-Amin, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 146, 
(quoting United States v. McGaughey, 977 F.2d 1067, 1~.71 (7th Cir.1992)). The 
rule implicitly requires knowing what the "original writing" was. Id. '"[T]he rule 
requiring the production of the original as proof of contents has developed as a rule 
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of preference: if failure to produce the original is satisfactorily explained, secondary 
evidence is admissible."' Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 976 (D. Mass. 1996), 
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), quoting the 
Fed.R.Evid. 1004 advisory committee's note. 
In this case, Ken's statement would be inadmissible under 1004, even if it 
was an adequate statement about the contents of the document he reviewed. First, 
the plaintiffs do not allege, and the alleged facts do not indicate, that an original 
copy of trust document Ken reviewed cannot be obtained by any available judicial 
process. If they did, the document would still be inadmissible because Ken has not 
testified to whether the copy he saw was the original or that an original document 
exists. Additionally, the plaintiffs have not alleged that the document is missing 
because it is in possession of another and cannot be obtained by any available 
judicial process or procedure. Finally, the statement is inadmissable because the 
rule requires that the proponent not only know that there is a writing, but be able to 
properly authenticate the contents of the writing. In this case, Ken has not 
adequately testified to the foundation of the alleged trust document. 
Ken's Statement is Inadmissable Hearsay as Offered by Andrew. 
Hearsay is a statement that "the declarant does not make while testifying at the 
current trial or hearing; and a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 801. The nonhearsay exceptions include 
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"a declarant-witness's prior statement" or an "Opposing Party's Statement." 
Ken's statement is not a declarant-witness's prior statement. In order for 
Ken's statement to be a declarant-witness' s prior statement it must be "inconsistent 
with the declarant's testimony or the declarant [must have denied] having made the 
statement or has forgotten" or the statement must be "consistent with the declarant's 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant 
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so 
testifying" or ~'identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier." Id. 
(A)(B)©. Ken's statement is not admissible as an opposing party's statement 
because the statement was not offered against the prqponent plaintiff, but was made 
byLliem. 
Plaintiffs offer Ken's statement indirectly through Andrew's deposition. 
Therefore, under Rule 801, Ken's statement is inadmissible as it is. offered through 
Andrew. It is hearsay and not admissible under any of the hearsay trxception~. 
Transferring of Assets into Trust. There are several ways by which 
property and assets could be, and were, transferred into the EFf. The primary and 
only way described in the trust provisions is to list them in the schedules. Another 
way to transfer property into the EFf is to transfer them pursuant to a docuµient 
that would legally accomplish the transfer- such as a warranty deed. This was done 
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when the Ellsworths transferred their marital home and 6-plex to the trust. A third 
way is to name the trust as owner of an account into which assets are placed. This 
was done when the W edbush Securities account was created. Another way is to 
transfer property into the trust pursuant to the provisions of a will. Each of these 
will be addressed in tum. 
I. Provisions of the Trust Document. In Utah, trusts are governed by the language 
of the document that created the them. In Makoffv. Makoff, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the "general rule of construction of written instruments apply to the 
construction of trust instruments." 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974). When "the trust is 
based on a written instrument, the intention of the settlor must be ascertained from 
the language thereof, and the court may not go outside of the language in an effort to 
give effect to what it thinks the intent was." Id. "So long as a court confines its 
analysis to the language of the trust instrument and does not resort to extrinsic 
evidence of intent, the interpretation of the trust is an issue of law." Hoggan v 
Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 'I[ 7, 169 P.3d 750. 
In Warne v. Warne, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the terms of the family 
trust. The parties disputed the distribution of the deceased settlor' s personal 
property. The Court looked to the language of the trust to determine the settlor's 
intent. 2013 UT 13, <J[ 44, 275 P.3d 238. The settlor's intent was determined by a 
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plain reading of the terms of the trust. The Court did not read terms into the 
governing document and then interpret those terms as the intent of the settlor. Id. 
In this case, the provisions of the EFT include specific directives regarding 
how property was to be made a part of its corpus. Despite not listing the transferred 
property on Schedule A as the trust terms directed, in May of 1991, Elmer and 
Barbara executed a Warranty Deed that transferred two parcels of property-the marital 
home and a 6-plex-to EFf. After Ehner's death, an investment account at Wedbush 
Securities, Inc. was created to be held by Barbara, as the Trustee of EFf. Beyond this, 
there is no other admissible evidence that other assets were listed on the schedules or 
described as being.transferred to the trust. The court concludes that because the trust is 
based on a written instrument, the intention of the settlor c&, be ascertained from the 
language thereof, and the court may not go outside of the language in an effort to give 
effect to what the court thinks the intent was. Without other admissible evidence for the 
court to consider, and so long as a court confines its analysis to _the language of the trust 
instrument and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the interpretation of the 
trust is an-issue of law. Therefore, because the interpretation of trust is an issue of law, 
it needs not be determined by a fact finder in the context of a trial. 
II. Transfer by Will: [T]o be effective to prove the transfer of any propert~ or to 
nominate a personal representative, a will must be declared to be valid qy an order of 
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informal probate by the registrar, or an adjudication of probate by the court .... Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-102. "A will is construed to pass all property the testator owns at 
death and all property acquired by the estate after the testator's death." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-2-602. ''The rule of construction that the intent of the testator must be carried out 
does not authorize courts to make a new will to conform to what they think the testator 
intended, but the intent of the testator must be ascertained from the will as it stands." In 
re Beal's Estate, 214 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1950). 4 
A. Express Devise. There are two wills that could possibly transfer personal property 
into the EFf: Elmer's will·and Barbara's will. In the fourth section of Elmer's will it 
reads: 
If my spouse survives me, I give all items of Personal Property (as 
hereinafter defined). If my spouse dose not survive me, I give those items 
of Personal Property (but not my money, notes, documents of title, stock 
certificates or business property) to the individuals named in my 
Memorandum of Disposition of Persona~ property. 
"The disputed.facts in this case, do allege that the Ellsworth's attorney Steve Skabelund 
provided a "Memorandum" dated May 1, 1991 to the Ellsworth'.s which provided a brief 
summary Qf the estate planning documents. And that Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum, and not 
the will, states: "Pour-Over Wills. The wills simply "pour" all assets "overn.to the trtistee(s) of 
your Family Tru~t." Though the actual will contains a pour-over disposition, the Memorandum 
is not a part of the actual Will. Therefore, it is not admissible because the Will is unambiguous 
and therefore extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. Additionally, Mr. S~abelund's opinion is a 
legal conclusion. 
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In the Fifth Section of Elmer's will, entitled "Disposition of Residuary 
Estate" it reads: 
"My residuary estate" means all my interest in real and personal property, 
whether community or separate and whenever situated, which I may own 
at my death (excluding property over which I may have a power of 
appointment) and which I have not disposed of by the preceding 
provisions of this Will. 
I give my residuary estate to the Trustee then acting under that certain 
Trust Agreement named the ELLSWORTH FAMILY TRUST created on 
the 1st day of May 1991 .... It is my intention that the residuary of my 
estate be "pour-over" to the ELLSWORTH FAMil., Y TRUST .... 
Elmer's will leaves the reader anticipating a list of personal property that will 
specifically be transfer to Barbara upon Elmer's death. Elmer never made that list. He 
did convey property to the trust, but he did not convey all of his personal property to the 
trust. Even though Elmer does not define the words "Personal Property," the term is 
susceptible to construing it by its ordinary meaning. As a result, it can be assumed that 
Elmer's intent concerning the distribution of his personal property is the same as the 
conclusion a plain reading of the Will communicates. 
A plain reading of the Will explains that Barbara is to receive Elmer's personal 
property which was not transferred to someone else or to the family trust. Elmer's 
exclusion, purposeful or not, of precious metals or possibly other items of property that 
was to be. transferred to the trust does not authorize the court to make a new will to 
conform to what the court thinks the testator may have intended, but the intent of the 
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testator must be ascertained from the Will as it stands. Thus, even if the Will were 
effective, it would not transfer precious metals into the trust. 
Based on the statement of facts, Barbara's personal property has not been 
,.,iJ transferred into the EFT via her will. Whether there is effective language in her will that 
could potentially transfer her personal property into the EFT is not an a question that can 
be determined until the facts indicate that Barbara is deceased and that her will has been 
probated. The parties have not alleged in their statement of facts that either of these 
events hav.~ occurred as of January 1, 2013.5 
A pour-over will, a "will giving money or property to an existing trust,'' 
"assures that property not transferred to the trust during life will be combined with 
the property the settlor did manage to convey." Wil...L, Black's Law Dictionary 
(9th ed. 2009); Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-604, cmt. Pour-over dispositions in wills 
are not exempt from the need of being probated. The trust into which property is 
. .;u being placed is, in a sense, a devisee of the will. 
. A$ a part of a will, the pour-over provision is subject to the same constraints 
that other parts of a will are subject to by statute. Therefore the pour-over disposition in 
5The alleged facts indicate that, at some point before litigation, the precious metals may 
have been treated as if they had been transferred to the EFf. However, as stated before, transfer 
of property into a trust must be done in a specific way none of which include solely treating 
property as if it is a part of a trust. 
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Elmer's will is not automatically effective upon the death of the testator, but must be 
probated. 
B. Timely Probate of a Will. According to Utah law, 
Except as provided in Section 75-3-1201, to be effective to prove the 
transfer of any property or to nominate a personal representative, a will 
must be declared to be valid by an order of informal probate by the 
registrar, or an adjudication of probate by the court, except that a duly 
executed and unrevoked will which has not been probated may be 
admitted as evidence of a devise if both: 
( 1) no court proceeding concerning the succession or administration of the 
estate was commenced during the time period for testacy proceedings; and 
(2) either the devisee or the devisee' s successors and assigns possessed the 
property devised in accordance with the provisions of the will, or the 
property devis.ed was not possessed or c·laimed by anyone by virtue of the 
decedent's title during the time period for testacy proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-102. 
~o informal probate proceeding or formal testacy proceeding, other than a 
proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator's domicile 
and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been 
a prior appointment, may be commenced more than three years after the 
decedent's death. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-107(1). However, the statute provides for exceptions. "If a 
previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact of the decedent's 
death," or if the proceeding is "in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or 
missing person," or if it is a "proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to 
secure appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event the 
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contest is successful ... " then the law provides that informal probate can be commenced 
more than three years after the decedent's death. Id. (a)(b)(c). Additionally, 
[i]f no will is probated within three years from death, the presumption of 
intestacy is final and the court shall upon filing a proper petition enter an 
order to that effect. The court also has continuing jurisdiction to: (a) 
determine what property was owned by the decedent at the time of death; 
and (b) appoint a personal representative or special administrator to 
administer the decedent's estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107(3). 
The restrictions that Utah Code Ann.§ 75-3-102 places on wills that have not 
been declared valid through an order of informal probate do not apply to Elmer's will. 
Barbara had all the precious metals because (1) there was no probate, (2) she possessed 
the property, i.e. the precious metals when Elmer died. 
It is not asserted within the disputed or undisputed facts that Elmer's will was 
probated within the three years after his death. If there is a valid pour-over disposition 
of Elmer's will, it needed to be probated within three years of Elmer's death since the 
alleged facts do not indicate that any of the above stated exceptions come into play here. 
Furthermore, the alleged facts do not indicate whether Barbara's will has any effect on 
the distribution of her personal property as of January 2013. Therefore, the wills and the 
pour-over provision are ineffective as it pertains to transferring the precious metals into 
the EFr: 
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CONCLUSION 
The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There is no 
genuine issue as to any material facts on the issue of whether the precious metals are or, 
or ever were, transferred into the Ellsworth Family Trust through the attached schedules 
or through Elmer Ellsworth's will. When the facts and all reasonable inferences are 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party summary judgment 
is appropriate. For these reasons and the ones listed above, partial summary judgement 
is GRANTED. Defendants' counsel shall submit an order for the court's signature. 
Dated this the 1st day of April 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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